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From Smokes to Smokestacks: 
Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability 
 





In this Article, we imagine a future, circa 2030, wherein the world has managed to avoid the 
worst climate change, yet has begun to experience considerable warming. Governments of all 
levels, especially at the state and provincial-level, are incurring unprecedented costs to mitigate 
the effects of climate change and adapt to new and uncertain climatic regimes. We consider how 
legislatures might respond to these imagined challenges. In our view, the answer may lie in the 
unprecedented story of tobacco liability, and especially the promulgation of state and provincial 
legislation specifically designed to enable the recovery of the public healthcare costs of tobacco-
related diseases in the 1990s. This Article delves into the legally-relevant differences and 
similarities between the tobacco industry and the fossil-fuel industry. It also sets out the main 
elements of a potential Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Act, mirroring 
similar legislation passed to combat tobacco-related issues. As will be seen, the design of such 
legislation engages several complex legal issues, implicating not only tort doctrine but also 
questions of legislative competence and private international law. Nevertheless, our initial 
assessment is that such legislation is both likely and feasible. Our analysis focuses primarily on 
Canadian law but is relevant to other jurisdictions grappling with the increasing costs of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: A CLIMATE CHANGED CANADA 
The year is 2030. In Canada, mean annual temperatures have increased two degrees 
Celsius over most land areas, with the greatest increases occurring in northern and eastern 
Canada as well as during the winter and spring seasons.1 Heat waves are more common than they 
were thirty years ago.2 Canada’s lakes have warmed, resulting in more frequent algal blooms and 
                                                
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 10 
(R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer ed.s, 2015) [hereinafter IPCC5]; F.J. WARREN & D.S. LEMMON ED.S, 
CANADA IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: SECTOR PERSPECTIVES ON IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION 27 
(GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 2014). Between 1950 and 2010, Canada’s average temperatures had already 
increased by 1.5 degrees Celsius, representing a rate of warming approximately twice the global average. 
See WARREN & LEMMON at 27.  
2 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 31-32 for a discussion of current upward temperature trends 
and for projected changes.  
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corresponding declines in freshwater fish populations.3 Mean annual precipitation and the 
number of yearly extreme precipitation events have also increased.4 At the same time, Alberta 
and Saskatchewan are experiencing drought conditions as a result of declining mean annual 
streamflow5 and intermittent flood events. Cold season storms have shifted poleward.6 Coastal 
areas are experiencing erosion from a combination of sea level rise and higher intensity storms.7 
Changes in ocean temperatures, currents, and acidification have disrupted marine ecosystems.8 
The world has managed to avoid the worst climate change (RCP8.5), yet has begun to experience 
considerable warming (between RCP2.6 and RCP4.5).9  
The effects of these changes are felt environmentally, economically, and socially. In 
Western Canada, drought has led to disruptions in conventional agricultural production and has 
required construction of additional irrigation infrastructure.10 Decreased precipitation, increased 
evaporation, and rapidly shrinking glaciers in the West and North11 have begun to affect water 
levels in lakes and rivers, which in turn have begun to affect the reliability of hydroelectric 
generation. This problem is exacerbated in the summer when water levels are low and domestic 
energy demands are high due to the country’s shift away from natural gas-based heating to 
electricity-based cooling.12 Diminishing water resources have also significantly impacted the 
water-intensive activities associated with the production of oil and gas. In particular, Alberta’s 
Lower Athabasca River is under extreme pressure having exceeded its capacity to sustain both 
oil sands operations and its own downstream ecosystems.13 This is so despite the fact that 
                                                
3 Emily Chung, World's lakes are warming surprisingly quickly due to climate change, CBC NEWS (Dec. 
17, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/warming-lakes-1.3369700. 
4 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 31–32 for a discussion of observed changes in participation 
and extreme precipitation events. 
5 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1456–1457 (RK. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2015) [hereinafter 
IPCC]. 
6 Working Group I, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Observations: Surface, and 
Atmospheric Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 281 
(R.K. Pachuri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007). 
7 IPCC, supra note 5, at 364. 
8 Id. at 374. 
9 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Summary for Policy Makers, 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report, 
at 14–15 (Cambridge University Press) [IPCC5]. The acronym “RCP” stands for “Representative 
Concentration Pathways.” There are four pathways used in IPCC5. RCP8.5 is a “high pathway for which 
radiative forcing reaches >8.5 W/m2 by 2100 and continues to rise for some amount of time; [RCP4.5 and 
2.6 are] two intermediate ‘stabilization pathways’ in which radiative forcing is stabilized at approximately 
6 W/m2 and 4.5 W/m2 after 2100; and one pathway [RCP2.6] where radiative forcing peaks at 
approximately 3 W/m2 before 2100 and then declines.” Graham Wayne, The Beginner’s Guide to 
Representative Concentration Pathways, SKEPTICAL SCIENCE, at 11 (Aug. 2013), 
http://www.skepticalscience.com/rcp.php.  
10 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 107 for a discussion of changing suitability of lands to 
support specified crops and the impacts of pests, diseases, and invasive alien species. 
11 Id. at 7–8. 
12 Id. at 69, 84. 
13 Emily Chung, Oilsands may face severe water shortages, Athabasca River study suggests, CBC NEWS 
ONLINE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/oilsands-water-use-1.3237239. 
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significant amounts of money have been spent to build additional off-stream water storage.14 
Indeed, climate change has adversely impacted resource industries at all stages of operation, 
particularly in the North where thawing permafrost and associated instability pose a risk for 
energy infrastructure like pipelines.15 Northern resource companies are spending large amounts 
of money to drive pile foundations deeper and to fly-in supplies as winter roads now have shorter 
operating seasons.16  
Agricultural production is increasingly impacted by invasive species and diseases, 
resulting in significant annual losses for some crops. Forestry has been affected by fires and 
invasive species.17 Offshore ocean acidification and warming have put further stress on fish 
stocks.18 For many species, the rate of environmental change exceeds their ability to adapt. Such 
shifts in species distribution have resulted in novel ecosystems with different species 
assemblages, structural attributes, and ecological functions.19  Despite a boom in ‘last chance 
tourism’ during which time visitors rush to see glaciers and wildlife species before they 
disappear, an overall decline in winter tourism contributes to unemployment, especially in 
Alberta and British Columbia.20 
All levels of government, but especially provincial-level governments, are incurring 
unprecedented costs as they try to simultaneously adapt to this new climactic reality and pay for 
damage to public infrastructure. Rising sea levels have required extensive modifications to urban 
centers and transportation infrastructure along Canada’s coasts, including shoreline protection 
and the relocation of roads. Canada’s northern communities face similar difficulties, which are 
driven by more frequent wildfires. Across the board, ensuring reliable water services has 
required significant investment.21 Another significant strain on public healthcare services comes 
from the increased heat waves and the migration of infectious and climate sensitive diseases, 
such as Lyme disease and West Nile virus.22 Mental health costs have also increased, particularly 
in the North where many people have lost their livelihoods and their connection to traditional 
                                                
14 In 2010, an expert panel of the Royal Society of Canada suggested that concerns relating to 
withdrawals during low-flow periods might be addressed by capturing additional water in off-stream 
storage during spring peak flow periods. PIERRE GOSSELIN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH 
IMPACTS OF CANADA’S OIL SANDS INDUSTRY 284 (The Royal Society of Canada 2010).   
15 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 70. 
16 See Christa Marshall, Canada Struggles with Melting Permafrost as Climate Warms, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (July 7, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/canada-struggles-with-melting-
permafrost-as-climate-warms/. 
17 Bruce Cheadle, Climate Change Bringing larger forest fires, more bugs, diseases, Natural Resources 
Canada warns, THE CANADIAN PRESS (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/09/28/climate-change-bringing-larger-forest-fires-more-bugs-
diseases-natural-resources-canada-warns.html. 
18 Canadian Press, Canada's marine ecosystems face threat: report, CBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2010), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/canada-s-marine-ecosystems-face-threat-report-
1.932414http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/canada-s-marine-ecosystems-face-threat-report-1.932414. 
19 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 161. 
20 Id. at 147, 148.  
21 Id. at 236. See also David Thurton, Fort McMurray seeing big spike in water-treatment costs, CBC 
NEWS (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-water-treatment-
costs-contaminants-1.3973249.  
22 See WARREN & LEMMON, supra note 1, at 173, 221. 
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cultural practices.23 Those costs borne by federal and provincial governments for climate related 
disasters in past decades, like the $1.5 billion associated with the Fort McMurray, Alberta fire in 
201624 or the nearly $5 billion to recover and rebuild infrastructure after the Alberta floods in 
2013,25 pale in comparison to the costs now incurred by the government. 
Faced with an insurmountable fiscal gap and continuing funding pressures, members of 
British Columbia’s Legislative Assembly, sitting in the 3rd session of the 45th Parliament, have 
just finished their most recent debate of Bill 48, the Climate Change Damages and Adaptation 
Costs Recovery Act. Excerpts from the Act’s debate, recorded in Hansard, are as follows:26 
  
Hon J. MacPhail Jr. (Minister of Environment and Climate Change): “This 
legislation . . .gives the government . . .the legal authority to proceed to courts to 
collect [infrastructure, healthcare] and other prescribed costs resulting from 
[climate change-related effects] such as [rising sea levels, increased flooding and 
disease]. With this legislation, we are trying to ensure that court action is not 
thrown out on technical grounds. For too long, the [fossil-fuel industry] has had 
an unfair advantage in court. Our proposed legislation allows for the introduction 
in court of statistical evidence . . . This will allow the case to be made even more 
strongly and more clearly that [the burning of fossil fuels causes climate change 
and its related effects]. 
 
“In addition, we are including a section regarding liability based on risk 
contribution. It will mean that [in an action against fossil fuel companies] the 
government [will not] have to prove that [their specific product or activity caused 
climate change], but that [the burning of fossil fuels] generally causes [climate 
change] . . .With this legislation, we are also extending the limitation period . . . 
.””27  
 
M. de Jong Jr.: “I guess it just bears emphasizing, then, that these are special 
rules. They are justified on the basis, as I understand it, of […] who the 
defendants are anticipated to be.” 
 
                                                
23 Id. at 208, 215. 
24 The Conference Board of Canada estimates the total costs of this fire to be $5.3 billion, with private 
insurers responsible for approximately $3.6 billion in claims. NEWS RELEASE, CONFERENCE BOARD OF 
CANADA, Fort McMurray Wildfires to Cost Governments and Insurers More Than $5 Billion (Nov. 
2016), http://www.conferenceboard.ca/press/newsrelease/16-11-
15/fort_mcmurray_wildfires_to_cost_governments_and_insurers_more_than_5_billion.aspx. 
25 MNP, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ALBERTA’S RESPONSE TO AND RECOVERY 
FROM 2013 FLOODS 1 (July 2015). 
26 The following excerpts are borrowed almost verbatim from Hansard that accompanied the passage of 
British Columbia’s Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, see infra note 27, except that 
the terminology has been changed from tobacco to climate change-relevant. For simplicity, the names 
used here are the names of the original members of the legislature discussing that legislation, with the 
addition of the “Jr.” suffix. 
27 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly 
(Hansard), 36th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 7, No. 5 (July 22, 1997) at 6110 (Hon. J. MacPhail).  
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Hon J. MacPhail Jr.: “Let me say that they are not special rules in terms of 
stacking the odds. They are rules to deal with the complexities of the matter that 
will be brought forward for the court […]. As we said at second reading, it is to 
ensure that the playing field is fair – given the complexity of the action – and also 
that the matter proceeds to court in an orderly way.”28  
 
S. Hawkins Jr.: “This section permits the court to admit evidence that otherwise 
was not admissible as evidence, and I wonder what the public policy behind this 
section is.” 
 
Hon. J. MacPhail Jr.: “First of all, I'll describe what this clause does. It allows the 
court to establish causation and to quantify damages for [climate change]-related 
damages on an aggregate basis, as opposed to an individual basis, through the use 
of statistical evidence… provided the information was compiled in accordance 
with accepted statistical standards. The reason for this is that in the past, court 
cases have been rejected on the basis of technicalities.”29  
 
Hon. P. Priddy Jr.: “At trial, the government must initially prove [two] elements 
of the case: first, that the [fossil fuel] industry breached a legal duty, such as the 
failure to warn of dangers inherent in [fossil fuel] products . . .; second, that 
[combustion of fossil fuels contributed to climate change]. Once these elements 
are proven, the burden shifts to the [fossil fuel] companies. It will then be their 
obligation to show that their breach of a legal duty did not cause or did not 
contribute to any or all of the costs that […] were incurred. 
 
“One further change involves the extent of liability of an individual [retailer or] 
manufacturer. These amendments establish a presumption that when the 
government presents its case against a manufacturer, the manufacturer will be 
liable for the proportion of public costs equivalent to its share of the market for 
that product. However, it will be open to the manufacturer to show that such 
apportionment is unfair . . . .”30 
 
If the passages excerpted above and the legislation described therein seem improbable or 
even fantastical, readers may be surprised to learn that they are an almost verbatim reproduction 
of some of the Hansard from British Columbia’s 36th Parliament, which in 1997 passed the 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act31 to create “a new civil cause of action” 
in British Columbia that permitted the government to directly recoup the public healthcare costs 
associated with tobacco-related disease.32 As further discussed in the next Section, while that 
                                                
28 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly 
(Hansard), 36th Parliament, 2nd Session, Vol. 7, No. 8 (July 24, 1997) at 6313 (Hon. J. MacPhail). 
29 Id. at 6315. 
30 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly 
(Hansard), 36th Parliament, 3rd Session, Vol. 12, No. 11 (July 29, 1998) at 10713 (Hon. Priddy). 
31 Tobacco Damages Recovery Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 41, s.13 amended by S.B.C. 1998, c. 45, repealed by 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c.30, s. 11. 
32 JTI-Macdonald Corp. v. AGBC, 2000 BCSC 312, ¶ 12 (CanLII). 
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initial law was struck down by the Supreme Court of British Columbia,33 a subsequent bill was 
re-drafted and upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco 
Canada Ltd.34 and almost every Canadian province has since passed similar legislation.35    
In this Article, we examine the developments that led to the passage of the Tobacco 
Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act and assess the likelihood that climate change 
litigation and liability will follow a similar path. More specifically, we assess the potential for, 
and feasibility of, a similarly structured Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs 
Recovery Act and the Acts implications for the fossil-fuel industry.  
To be sure, we are not suggesting that legislation is a necessary pre-requisite to climate 
litigation. As further discussed in Section II infra, there is already a growing first wave of such 
litigation against both governments and corporations,36 and new legal theories of liability 
continue to be developed and tested.37 In Canada, for example, lawyers at West Coast 
Environmental Law recently sent letters to municipalities throughout British Columbia urging 
them to consider joining a class action against major fossil fuel companies to recover the costs of 
climate change adaptation.38 In 2014, several environmental groups in Canada sent letters to 
various energy companies asking them about their climate change communications and lobbying 
practices. These environmental groups admitted to drawing their inspiration from the legal fight 
against the tobacco industry: “We’re laying the groundwork for court cases to come… In many 
ways, the oil industry is right now where the tobacco industry was back in the 1980s.”39  
                                                
33 Id. at ¶¶ 237, 238. 
34 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at ¶ 3 (Can.).  
35 Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. T-3.002 (Can.); Tobacco 
Damages and Health-care Costs Recovery Act, S.N.S. 2005, c. 46 (Can.); Tobacco Damages and Health 
Care Costs Recovery Act, S.N.B. 2006, c. T-7.5 (Can.); Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs 
Recovery, S.S. 2007, c. T-14.2 (Can.); Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, SO 2009, 
c 13 (Can.); Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.Nu. 2010, c. 31 (Can.) (not yet in 
force); Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, C.C.S.M. 2012, c. T70 (Can.); Tobacco- 
related Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, CQLR 2009, c. R-2.2.0.0.1 2009 
(Can.).  
36 Michael Burger, Local Governments in California File Common Law Claims Against Largest Fossil 
Fuel Companies, SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: CLIMATE LAW BLOG (July 18, 2017), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2017/07/18/local-governments-in-california-file-common-
law-claims-against-largest-fossil-fuel-companies/. Most recently, on July 17, 2017, three California 
counties (San Mateo County, Marin County and the City of Imperial Beach), filed statements of claim 
against twenty fossil-fuel companies which they allege are responsible for approximately twenty percent 
of all global emissions and, consequently, a substantial portion of the costs incurred by those counties in 
mitigating the effects of climate change, especially sea level rise. The statements of claim for these cases 
are available on the Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law’s website: http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/. 
We also discuss them further in Section III.B.2 infra.  
37 See Peter Frumhoff et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Polluters, 132 CLIMATE 
CHANGE 157 (2015) for a discussion of the conceptual responsibility of corporations. See also CLIMATE 
CHANGE JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING 
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF CLIMATE DISRUPTION 147-154 (2014) for a discussion of the 
growing international recognition of corporate responsibility for human rights harms stemming from 
climate change.  
38 See Liam Britten, Should Cities Sue Fossil Fuel Companies for Climate Change Costs, CBC NEWS 
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/climate-change-lawsuit-1.3952498. 
39 Canadian Press, Energy Firms Warned Over Communication About Climate Change: Strategy 




At the same time, private liability for climate change can be a jarring idea in some circles. 
Responding to the above-noted 2014 letter writing campaign, an editorial in the Calgary Herald 
argued that the comparison between the tobacco and energy industries “doesn’t stand up to even 
cursory examination. One is a product that is always hazardous to human health when consumed, 
the other is a staple of the modern world.”40 Perhaps most importantly, the fossil fuel industry, 
including fossil fuel producers and manufacturers of fossil fuel consuming products like cars, 
does not currently regard climate change liability as a substantial risk. The Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers dismissed the environmental groups’ 2014 effort as a “stunt.”41 More 
recently, in the United States, the world’s largest auto-manufacturers asked the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) “to reconsider a recent decision to lock in strict fuel efficiency 
standards for cars and light trucks to be produced in model years 2022 to 2025.”42 This request 
suggests that the industry sees government regulation as the only relevant floor for its conduct 
even though “compliance with a statutory standard of care does not abrogate or supersede the 
obligation to comply with the common law standard of care.”43 In other words, the fossil fuel 
industry does not seem concerned with tort law’s historic role “as backdrop and partner to 
environmental, health, and safety regulation.”44  
At its core, this Article serves as a reminder that the law is not static. Legal systems, 
including rules of responsibility and liability, change with advancements in scientific 
understanding and shifts in societal values. Such legal changes can play an important role in 
societal change.45 Section II of this Article sets out the history and current state of regulation, 
litigation, and liability in both the tobacco and climate change contexts. Section III uses the 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act as a lens to set out the main elements of 
a Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Act. It will show how the design of 
such legislation engages several complex issues, including tort doctrine, especially causation and 
apportionment, and questions of legislative competence and private international law. The 
Article concludes in Section IV with an initial assessment concerning the likelihood and viability 
of such legislation and the implications for the fossil fuel industry today. Although potentially 
constrained in some respects, such legislation is both likely and feasible. Furthermore, the fossil 
                                                                                                                                                       
Modelled After Campaign Against Tobacco Companies, CBC NEWS (May 28, 2014) 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/energy-firms-warned-over-communication-about-climate-change-
1.2657185.  
40 Editorial, Environmental Groups Forget Where Their Pleadings Would Take Us, THE CALGARY 
HERALD (June 2, 2014), http://calgaryherald.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-environmental-groups-
forget-where-their-pleadings-would-take-us.  
41 Canadian Press, supra note 39.  
42 Juliet Eilperin & Steven Overly, Automakers Ask EPA to Overturn Recent Review of Fuel-Efficiency 




43 Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201, 204 (Can.) (“Compliance with a statutory standard of care 
does not abrogate or supersede the obligation to comply with the common law standard of care. The 
requirements are concurrent, and each carries its own penalty for breach.”).   
44 Douglas Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). 
45 Neil Gunningham, R Kagan, & D Thornton, Social License and Environmental Protection: Why 
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 329 (2004). 
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fuel industry will have to adopt courses of action that seek to avoid further climate change, 
prevent, avoid, or mitigate liability. To achieve this, industry could rapidly adopt best available 
technologies, discontinue activities that provide disinformation, and warn consumers of the 
dangers of climate change associated with their products.46 
II. BACKGROUND: TOBACCO AND CLIMATE CHANGE COMPARED 
A. THE ONGOING HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION AND LIABILITY 
As further set out below, tobacco norms evolved overtime. Informed by scientific 
understanding of the dangers associated with smoking, a product that was initially ubiquitous 
with North American society faced increasing regulation and waves of litigation. Facing massive 
public healthcare costs associated with tobacco-related disease, this culminated in many 
Canadian provinces passing legislation that fundamentally changed the rules applicable to 
tobacco liability. 
1. The Evolution of Tobacco Norms 
Most accounts of the history of tobacco regulation and liability begin with the United 
States in the early 1950s. By this time, almost half of all Americans regularly consumed tobacco 
products.47 In a passage that is particularly salient to this Article, however, Professor Robert 
Rabin has suggested that: 
 
. . . raw numbers fail to convey the mystique attached to the cigarette. Observers 
of popular culture remind us of the dramatic impact of cigarettes in the movies . . . 
Then there was the ubiquitous advertising presence of athletes, high society and 
professional figures, as well as celebrities from the entertainment world, 
endorsing smoking on billboards, in magazines, and over the radio. It seems no 
exaggeration to say that Americans loved the cigarette almost as much as the 
automobile.  
 
In these early days, there was hardly a trace of the risk-sensitivity that has fueled 
the products liability litigation of the past twenty-five years.48  
 
In stark contrast to current standards and norms, smoking was acceptable in virtually 
every context and place; people could even smoke in schools, hospitals, airplanes, buses, and 
restaurants. However, all of this began to change in 1952. That year, Readers Digest published 
“Cancer by the Carton,” which summarized in plain language the alarming scientific findings of 
                                                
46 See Frumhoff et al., supra note 37, at 168 for a list of suggested steps fossil fuel companies should take 
to discharge their corporate responsibility in relation to climate change, including disclosing financial and 
physical risks of climate change to their operations and supporting the development of ambitious 
domestic and international policies designed to reduce GHG emissions to meet the Paris Agreement 
temperature goals.  
47 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING 
AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE 26 (1964). 
48 Robert L. Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 855 
(1992). 
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that time: smoking cigarettes increased the risk of cancer.49 Over the next two years, society saw 
consumption rates drop for the first time.50 This also brought about the genesis of the tobacco 
industry’s decades-long campaign to manufacture doubt about the growing scientific evidence 
linking tobacco consumption to disease.51 
What has come to be known as the first, and universally unsuccessful, wave of tobacco 
litigation soon followed, beginning with Lower v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.52 There were 
several reasons for this failure, including the tobacco industry’s adoption of a “scorched earth” 
litigation strategy of exhausting the plaintiffs’ resources by prolonging litigation.53 Plaintiffs also 
encountered difficulties with the relevant legal doctrines, especially when claiming that tobacco-
related harms were reasonably foreseeable at that time.54 The tobacco industry initially denied 
foreseeability, pursuing this strategy both in and outside of the courts.55 When the link between 
smoking and disease became irrefutable,56 leading to the passage of mandatory public health 
labelling,57 industry shifted its argument and claimed that the plaintiff smokers had assumed the 
risk of disease voluntarily.58 This defense effectively quashed the second wave of litigation.  
2. Increasing Awareness, Regulation and Litigation 
By the 1970s there was an increasing awareness of the dangers of second-hand smoking, 
and several states begin to impose restrictions on smoking in public places. In 1975, Minnesota 
passed the Clean Indoor Air Act, the United States’ first state-wide anti-second-hand smoke law 
intended to protect “the public health and comfort and the environment by prohibiting smoking 
in public places and at public meetings, except in designated smoking areas.”59 Similar bans 
followed throughout the United States and the rest of the western world, despite opposition from 
the tobacco industry and ancillary industries (e.g. the service industry).   
It was not until the late 1980’s that the direction and viability of tobacco litigation 
changed.  At that point, several U.S. states sought to recover the public healthcare costs 
associated with tobacco-related diseases, rather than the private costs.60 This strategy allowed 
                                                
49 Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER’S DIG. 35 (Dec. 1952). 
50 Rabin, supra note 48, at 856. 
51 Naomi Oreskes & Erik Conway, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED 
THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO CLIMATE WARMING 5–6 (2010).  
52 Rabin estimates that between 100 and 150 similar cases were subsequently filed. Rabin, supra note 48, 
at 857. 
53 Jeff Berryman, Canadian Reflections on the Tobacco Wars: Some Unintended Consequences of Mass 
Tort Litigation, 53 INT’L & COM. L. Q. 579, 580 (2004); Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the 
Visionaries that Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473 (1997–
98). 
54 Rabin, supra note 48, at 860–61. 
55 Oreskes & Conway, supra note 51, at 6. 
56 As reflected in the United States’ Surgeon General’s first report linking smoking and lung cancer. 
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND 
WELFARE, PUB. HEALTH SERVICE, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONT., SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMM. TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUB. HEALTH SERVICE 5 (1964). 
57 See Luca Paoletti et al., Current Status of Tobacco Policy and Control, J. OF THORACIC IMAGING 213 
(July 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3409436/. 
58 Rabin, supra note 48, at 862. 
59 MINN. STAT. ANN. §144.412 (West 2007). 
60 Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries That Led to the Proposed $368.5 Billion 
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states to avoid many of the pitfalls encountered by individual plaintiffs, such as limited financial 
resources and personal culpability. Some states, like Florida, passed laws to make such actions 
easier.61 This legal battle culminated in what is now known as the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement, the terms of which included approximately U.S. $240 billion for the recovery of 
Medicaid expenses incurred by its nearly fifty signatory U.S states. It also included an absolute 
ban on public advertisements for cigarettes.62 
 
Around this same time, the United States government brought a lawsuit against nine 
cigarette manufacturers and two tobacco-related trade organizations.63 The United States alleged 
that the defendants had and were continuing to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act64 by “engaging in a lengthy, unlawful conspiracy to deceive the American 
public about the health effects of smoking and environmental tobacco smoke, the addictiveness 
of nicotine, the health benefits from low tar, “light” cigarettes, and their manipulation of the 
design and composition of cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction.”65 The government 
was largely successful, with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
describing the case as follows:  
 
[This case] is about an industry, and in particular these Defendants, that survives, 
and profits, from selling a highly addictive product which causes diseases that 
lead to a staggering number of deaths per year, an immeasurable amount of 
human suffering and economic loss, and a profound burden on our national 
health care system. Defendants have known many of these facts for at least 50 
years or more. Despite that knowledge, they have consistently, repeatedly, and 
with enormous skill and sophistication, denied these facts to the public, to the 
Government, and to the public health community… In short, Defendants have 
marketed and sold their lethal product with zeal, with deception, with a single-
minded focus on their financial success, and without regard for the human tragedy 
or social costs that success exacted.66 
3. Tobacco Liability Legislation 
By this time, Canada had seen its own wave of largely unsuccessful private tobacco 
litigation.67 In 1997, however, drawing inspiration from the aforementioned U.S. states, British 
Columbia passed legislation that has since been copied in almost every Canadian province: the 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. This legislation, which was 
immediately and unsuccessfully challenged by the tobacco industry, does at least four things 
highly relevant to the climate change liability context:  
                                                                                                                                                       
Tobacco Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473, 478 (1997–98). 
61 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1995). 
62 Berryman, supra note 53, at 581. 
63 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2006). 
64 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2012). 
65 Philip Morris USA, Inc. 449 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27. 
66 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
67 Berryman, supra note 53, at 581. There has been a very recent class-action victory in Letourneau v. 
JTI-MacDonald Corp. [2015] QCCS 2382, where the Quebec Supreme Court awarded the plaintiffs $15 
billion in damages. 




1) It creates a direct action against tobacco companies by the provinces to recover the public 
costs of healthcare incurred as a result of the tobacco-related disease where such disease 
is the result of some “tobacco-related wrong,” defined broadly as the breach of “a 
common law, equitable or statutory duty or obligation owed to persons” in that province; 
2) It permits the provinces to use statistical, epidemiological, and sociological evidence to 
establish causation on an aggregate basis and to quantify damages (i.e., the province’s 
cost of healthcare services for the tobacco-related disease); 
3) It apportions liability based on the market share of particular tobacco companies; and  
4) It applies retroactively. 
 
The passage of this type of legislation, coupled with the addition of government plaintiffs to 
tobacco litigation, fundamentally changed the rules of the tobacco liability game. The industry 
quickly and rigorously opposed this legislation because of its potential affect on industry 
liability.68 In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
last word on the matter, the industry challenged the legislation’s constitutional validity “on the 
basis that it violates: (1) territorial limits on provincial legislative jurisdiction; (2) the principle of 
judicial independence; and (3) the principle of the rule of law.”69  
 
Through an analysis that is critical to the viability of any climate change costs recovery 
legislation, the Court dismissed each of these arguments. With respect to extra-territoriality, the 
relevant head of legislative power contains an explicit territorial limit: “Property and Civil Rights 
in the Province.”70 The Court dismissed this aspect of the industry’s challenge, concluding that 
there are “strong relationships among the enacting territory (British Columbia), the subject 
matter of the law (compensation for the government of British Columbia’s tobacco-related health 
care costs) and the persons made subject to it (the tobacco manufacturers ultimately responsible 
for those costs).”71 It did not matter that the Act “may capture, to some extent, activities 
occurring outside of British Columbia.”72 As the Court explained:  
 
. . . no territory could possibly assert a stronger relationship to that cause of action 
than British Columbia. That is because there is at all times one critical connection 
to British Columbia exclusively: the recovery permitted by the action is in relation 
                                                
68 In addition to all of the litigation in British Columbia, the industry has challenged the same legislation 
in other provinces; See e.g. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. v. Québec (Procureure générale), [2015] 
QCCA 1554 (CanLII) (unsuccessfully challenging the legislation on Quebec Charter grounds). The 
Florida law upon which British Columbia’s statute was based was also unsuccessfully challenged. See 
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Industries of Fla. Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1257 (Fla. 1996).  
69 See British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, supra note 30, at ¶ 2 for a discussion on the  
jurisdiction and liability of the Act.  
70 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(13); British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2005 SCR 49 473, ¶ 26 
(quoting “Section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is the primary source of provincial legislatures’ 
authority to legislate. Provincial legislation must therefore respect the limitations, territorial and 
otherwise, on provincial legislative competence found in s. 92. The opening words of s. 92 —‘In each 
Province’ — represent a blanket territorial limitation on provincial powers. That limitation is echoed in a 
similar phrase that qualifies a number of the heads of power in s. 92: ‘in the Province.’”). 
71 Id. at ¶ 37. 
72 Id. at ¶ 38. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957921
13 
 
to expenditures by the government of British Columbia for the health care of 
British Columbians.73  
 
With respect to judicial independence, the tobacco industry argued that the legislation 
“violates judicial independence, both in reality and appearance, because it contains rules of civil 
procedure that fundamentally interfere with the adjudicative role of the court hearing an action 
brought pursuant to the Act.”74 Here, too, the Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the 
judiciary’s primary role is “to interpret and apply the law, whether procedural or substantive, to 
the cases brought before it . . .  The judiciary’s role is not . . . to apply only the law of which it 
approves . . . Nor is it to second-guess the law reform undertaken by legislators, whether that 
reform consists of a new cause of action or procedural rules to govern it.  Within the boundaries 
of the Constitution, legislatures can set the law as they see fit.”75  
 
Finally, with respect to the rule of law, the industry argued that this “requires that 
legislation: (1) be prospective; (2) be general in character; (3) not confer special privileges on the 
government, except where necessary for effective governance; and (4) ensure a fair civil trial.” 
The Supreme Court dismissed these arguments as well, noting that both prospectivity and the 
right to a fair trial have specifically been circumscribed to criminal, not civil, law matters.76  
 
The critical question thus becomes whether similar developments, specifically the passage of 
similarly structured Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Acts, are possible 
in the climate change context. As the next section sets out, legislation that enable governments to 
sue directly for the public costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and that permit 
reliance on statistical evidence to establish the relationship between human induced climate 
change and damage-causing weather events, would address some of the obstacles already 
encountered in climate litigation.  
 
B. THE EMERGING STORY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION AND LIABILITY 
 
 While still being written, the emerging story of climate change litigation and liability 
already bears a striking similarity to tobacco litigation and liability issues. Just as norms about 
                                                
73 Id. at ¶¶ 39-40. The Supreme Court went on to explain that the Court of Appeal’s “emphasis on the 
question of whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the breach of duty by a manufacturer that is a 
necessary condition of its liability under the cause of action created by the Act must occur in British 
Columbia…was undue, for two reasons. First, the driving force of the Act’s cause of action is 
compensation for the government of British Columbia’s health care costs, not remediation of tobacco 
manufacturers’ breaches of duty. While the Act makes the existence of a breach of duty one of several 
necessary conditions to a manufacturer’s liability to the government, it is not the mischief at which the 
cause of action created by the Act is aimed. The Act leaves breaches of duty to be remedied by the law 
that gives rise to the duty. Thus, the breaches of duty to which the Act refers are of subsidiary significance 
to the cause of action created by it, and the locations where those breaches might occur have little or no 
bearing on the strength of the relationship between the cause of action and the enacting jurisdiction.” Id. 
at ¶¶ 39-40 (emphasis added). 
74 Id. at ¶ 48.  
75 Id. at ¶¶ 50-52 (“The wisdom and value of legislative decisions are subject only to review by the 
electorate.”) (citing Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, ¶ 59). 
76 Id. at ¶¶ 63-73. 
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tobacco usage changed as awareness of its dangers grew, the norms surrounding fossil fuel use 
are changing in the face of an increased scientific understanding of climate change risks. In light 
of this increased knowledge, a first wave of litigation is building.  
 
1. The Evolution of Climate Change Awareness 
 
The scientific community has been evaluating the impacts of increasing levels of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere on the climate system for decades.77 While 
uncertainties remained around the scale of the impacts, by the late 1980s there was almost 
complete scientific consensus that the release of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, 
principally caused by the burning of fossil fuels, was the cause of observed changes in the earth’s 
climate. As the United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) scientist Dr. 
James Hansen stated in his 1988 testimony before the United States’ Congress “it was 99 percent 
certain that the [already observable] warming trend was…caused by a buildup of carbon dioxide 
and other artificial gases in the atmosphere.”78 Reporting on Hansen’s testimony, the front page 
of The New York Times concluded that the “issue of an overheating world had suddenly moved 
to the forefront of public opinion.”79  
The United States’ Congress responded by introducing the National Energy Policy Act,80 
with the national goals of (1) reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from 
1988 levels by at least twenty percent by the year 2000 and (2) establishing an International 
Global Agreement on the Atmosphere  by 1992.81 These headlines, and the response by 
Congress, should not have come as a surprise to key industry leaders, such as the fossil fuel giant 
Exxon Corporation, which by the 1970s had become corporate leaders in climate science 
research.82 
                                                
77 The basic mechanics of climate change have been understood for a long time, with observations that 
carbon dioxide (CO2) acts as a “greenhouse gas,” reflecting heat rising from the earth back to the surface 
back in 1859, see Steve Graham, John Tyndall, 1820-1893, NASA.GOV, (Oct. 8, 1999), 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Tyndall/, and recognition that the burning of fossil fuels was 
affecting mean temperatures of the earth at the twentieth century, see Steve Graham, Svante Arrhenius, 
1859-1927, NASA.GOV, (Jan. 18, 2000), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Arrhenius/.  
Commentators trace more sustained discussion of anthropogenic climate change to the 1950s, with reports 
in the 1960s and 1970s highlighting the significance of the problem socially and economically. See Peter 
Frumhoff et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Polluters, 132 CLIMATE CHANGE 157, 
161 (2015); Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686 (2004). 
78 Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-
senate.html?pagewanted=all. See also J. Hansen et al., Global Climate Changes as Forecast by Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies Three-Dimensional Model, 93 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 9341 (1988). 
79 John Noble Wilford, His Bold Statement Transforms the Debate on Greenhouse Effect, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 23, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/23/science/his-bold-statement-transforms-the-debate-
on-greenhouse-effect.html. 
80 H.R. 5380, 100th Cong. (1988). 
81 Id. 
82 An investigation conducted by InsideClimate News concludes that Exxon’s knowledge of climate 
change dates back to 1977 and that Exxon confirmed the global warming consensus with in-house climate 
models in 1982. See Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken.  




2. Climate Change and the International Community 
 
In the same year that Dr. Hansen testified before the United States’ Congress, the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide policymakers 
with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, 
and options for adaptation and mitigation.83 Two years later, the IPCC released its First 
Assessment Report, concluding with certainty that “emissions resulting from human activities 
are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon 
dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide” and that “[t]hese increases will 
enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's 
surface.”84 The IPCC’s First Assessment Report highlighted the need for global cooperation to 
address the climate change challenge. 
The international community further responded by agreeing to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).85 With the objective of “stabiliz[ing] 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system,”86 the Parties committed to establish 
national policies and measures to mitigate climate change.87 The UNFCCC marked the 
beginning of GHG regulation at both the international and domestic level. However, despite the 
UNFCCC, its companion the Kyoto Protocol,88 and voluntary commitments under the 
Copenhagen Accord,89 global concentrations of GHG emissions continue to increase. 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide are now at their highest levels in 
at least 800,000 years.90 Among developed countries the European Union (EU) stands alone in 
achieving significant emission reductions.91 While the newly in-force Paris Agreement92 aims to 
strengthen the post-2020 global response, existing national commitments made under the Paris 
                                                
83 See G.A. Res. 43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988). 
84 J.T. HOUGHTON, G.J. JENKINS, & J.J. EPHRAUMS, EDS., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT XI (1990). 
85 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.  
86 Id. at 4. 
87 Recognizing the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, while all Parties committed to 
put in place measures to mitigate climate change, developed country Parties committed to take the lead by 
putting in place policies and measures to modify longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent 
with the objective of the Convention. See id. at 5–6.  
88 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, Dec. 11, 
1997, U.N.T.S. 148.  
89 Decision 2/CP.15, Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, 
UNFCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
90 IPCC5, supra note 1, at 4. See also NASA, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: VITAL SIGNS OF THE PLANET, 
https://climate.nasa.gov (last visited Nov. 28, 2017). 
91 Sharon Mascher, Neglected Sovereignty: Filling Canada's Climate Change Gap with Unilateral 
Measures, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 361, 363–64 (2016). 
92 Paris Agreement Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 2.1.a, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev. 
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Agreement lack the ambition necessary to reverse upward global GHG emissions trends.93 
Additionally, the efficacy of the Paris Agreement is further challenged because the United States, 
under the presidency of Donald Trump, filed notice of its intention to withdraw from that 
agreement.94   
Nevertheless, the IPCC continues to make urgent calls to immediately stabilize and 
reduce GHG emissions to avoid irreversible environmental and consequential human rights 
impacts.95 The IPCC’s most recent Assessment Report confirmed not only that the planet’s 
surface and ocean temperatures are rising, but that it is “extremely likely [meaning 95-100%] 
that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th 
century.”96 Using the word “irreversible” twelve times in its Summary for Policy Makers, the 
Report also warns that only a finite amount of carbon can be burnt for it to even be possible to 
avoid warming of greater than two degrees Celsius.97  
The fossil fuel industry’s actions have also taken place in the face of growing 
understanding of the costs associated with climate change, in regards not only to the loss and 
damage climate change causes, but also to measures taken to adapt to climate change and to 
attempt to avoid the associated impacts. In 2011, for example, the National Roundtable on the 
Environment and Economy estimated that climate change will cost the Canadian economy 
between CAD$23 – 50 billion dollars annually by 2050.98 
Despite these urgent calls, expected costs, and increasing understanding of GHGs’ impact 
on climate, the fossil fuel industry has increased GHG emissions. Indeed, in his landmark study 
tracing 63 percent of cumulative worldwide emissions to 90 ‘carbon major’ entities, Heede found 
that half of those emissions have been emitted since 1986,99 essentially at the same time that the 
risks of climate change were becoming well known.100 Similarly, Frumhoff and his collegauges 
concluded that more than half of the industrial CO2 emissions since the Industrial Revolution 
                                                
93 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty 
First Session, Held in Paris from 30 Nov. to 13 Dec. 2015— Addendum — Part 2: Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its Twenty First Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter Adoption of the Paris Agreement]. 
94 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COMMUNICATION REGARDING INTENT TO WITHDRAW FROM PARIS 
AGREEMENT (2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm. 
95 WORKING GROUP I, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT passim (J.T. Houghton, 
G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums eds. 1990). 
96 IPCC5, supra note 1, at 17. 
97 Christopher McGlade & Paul Ekins, The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting 
global warming to 2 °C, 517 NATURE 187, (2015) (subsequent analysis has shown that the GHG 
emissions associated with burning proven fossil fuel reserves would exceed the earth’s remaining carbon 
budget). 
98 NAT’L ROUNDTABLE ON THE ENV’T AND THE ECON., PAYING THE PRICE: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE FOR CANADA 40 (2011). 
99 Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement 
producers, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 229, 229 (2014) (the analysis includes scope 1, 2 and use of product 
scope 3 emissions). 
100 Id. at 230. 
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have been emitted since 1988.101 Moreover, the same fossil fuel industry actors continue to emit 
GHGs.102 
The fossil fuel industry has also felt safe increasing GHG emissions in Canada. Canada’s 
total GHG emissions have increased by approximately 18 percent between 1990 and 2015,103 and 
absent significant regulatory reform, the increase is projected to continue into the future.104 The 
key sectors driving Canada’s long-term emissions growth trend are the fossil fuel and 
transportation sectors,105 resulting from increases in both oil and gas production, particularly 
from the oil sands, and increases in the number of vehicles on the road, particularly trucks, vans 
and SUVs.106 While a growing number of regulatory measures directed at reducing GHG 
emissions in these and other sectors within the Canadian economy exist,107 federal and provincial 
                                                
101 See Frumhoff et al., supra note 37, at 164. 
102 Over sixty percent of the industrial CO2 and methane emissions released globally between 1854 and 
2010 can be traced to just ninety fossil fuel and cement producers. Heede, supra note 99, at 238. 
103 Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Report 1: Progress on Reducing 
Greenhouse Gases—Environment and Climate Change Canada, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF 
CANADA, Exhibit 1.2, 1.5 (June 12, 2017), http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201710_e_42475.html [hereinafter CESD Report] (showing 
Canada’s total GHG emissions have risen from 611 megatonnes (MT) in 1990 to 722 MT in 2015);  see 
also, ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS: 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5, ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. ED. 2017.  
104 CESD Report, supra note 103, at Exhibit 1.46 (this Report goes on to conclude that “if all of the 
greenhouse gas reduction measures outlined in the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and 
Climate Change are introduced and implemented in a timely manner, the Department estimates that those 
measures will result in a reduction of 175 megatonnes by 2030”). 
105 Government of Canada, Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=F60DB708-1.  Other significant 
sectors include electricity generation, some industrial processes (such as cement and agriculture), and 
buildings. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE AND LIGHT TRUCK 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION REGULATION, SOR/2010-201 (ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 2017); 
ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE AND ENGINE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
REGULATIONS, SOR/2013-24 (ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 2017); ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
CAN., HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLE AND ENGINE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REGULATIONS, SOR/2013-24 
(ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 2017); ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., RENEWABLE FUELS 
REGULATIONS, SOR/2010-189 (ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 2017); ENV’T AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE CAN., REDUCITON OF CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM COAL-FIRED GENERATION OF 
ELECTRICITY, SOR/2012-167 (ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 2017).  The Can. Press & Nat’l 
Observer, Canada’s Catherine McKenna announces coal phase out for 2030, NAT’L OBSERVER (Nov. 21, 
2016), https://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/11/21/news/canadas-catherine-mckenna-announces-coal-
phase-out-2030 (stating a Federal Government has also announced the introduction of a pan-Canadian 
carbon price (or equivalent) rising to $50 per tonne by 2022; is also developing clean fuel standard); see 
Harper Government Moves Forward on Tough Rules for Coal-Fired Electricity Sector, ENV’T & 
CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=714D9AAE-
1&news=4D34AE9B-1768-415D-A546-8CCF09010A23 (more aggressive regulation of coal-fired 
generation ); ENV’T. AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., CANADA’S MID-CENTURY LONG-TERM LOW-
GREENHOUSE GAS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, ENV’T. AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. (ENV’T. AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE CAN.) (foreshadowed further regulation of the fossil fuel sector). 
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government regulations and regulatory approvals contemplate the expansion of these GHG 
intensive sectors, particularly in relation to oil and gas.108 
3. Climate Change Litigation 
Recognizing that the incremental pace of domestic and international-level politics and 
policy development are ill-suited to rapidly de-carbonize modern economies, there is an 
increasing focus on climate change litigation throughout the world. Legal actions relating to 
some aspect of climate change mitigation, adaptation or loss and damage have been brought in 
over eighteen countries on six continents, with hundreds of cases in the United States alone.109 
The vast majority of these legal actions have sought to force governments to regulate GHG 
emissions, or to at least consider climate change in their decision-making processes.110 Some of 
these legal actions have been successful. For example, the landmark decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA,111 resulted in a ruling forcing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to regulate GHG 
emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act.112 The precedent-setting decision in Urgenda 
Foundation v. The State of Netherlands offers another example, with the District Court ordering 
the Dutch Government to “limit or have limited” national GHG emissions by at least twenty-five 
percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.113 However, many other legal actions against 
government have been unsuccessful. For example, in Friends of the Earth v. Canada (Governor 
in Council),114 the applicants were unable to force the federal government to comply with a law 
requiring Canada to honour its Kyoto Protocol targets to reduce GHGs.  
Increasingly, litigation strategies are focusing on the fossil fuel industries’ responsibility 
in relation to climate change—in what might be described as the first wave of civil climate 
change litigation. So far, the United States is the only common law jurisdiction in which the 
courts have been asked to consider corporations’ legal liability in tort law for damages caused by 
their contribution to climate change.115 However, these nascent efforts in the United States’ 
                                                
108 See, e.g., Climate Leadership Plan, ALBERTA GOVERNMENT, https://www.alberta.ca/climate-
leadership-plan.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) (the recent Federal Governmental approval to expand 
Kinder Morgan’s Trans-Mountain pipeline and the Government of Alberta’s 100 megatonne ‘cap’ on oil 
sands related GHG emissions, which leaves room to increase oil sands related emissions by 30 
megatonnes); Oils Sands Emissions Limit Act RSA 2016. 
109 JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO 
CLEANER ENERGY 1-2 (CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS ED. 2015); LAW DIVISION, UN ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION A GLOBAL REVIEW 11-14 (LAW DIVISION, UN ENV’T 
PROGRAMME ED. 2017); Sabin Center for Climate Change, U.S. Litigation Database, COLUMBA SCHOOL 
OF LAW, http://wordpress2.ei.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/us-climate-change-litigation/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
110 Id. 
111 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 560 (2007). 
112 Air Pollution Prevention and Control, 28 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1970).  
113 In re Urgenda Foundation, Case number C/09/456689 / HA ZA 13-1396 at 1 (Hague Dist. Court 
2015), https://elaw.org/system/files/urgenda_0.pdf.  
114 Friends of the Earth v. Can., 2008 F.C. 1183 (2008).  
115 Regional Court dismisses climate lawsuit against RWE—Claimant likely to appeal, GERMANWATCH 
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://germanwatch.org/en/13234 (English commentary on a civil law action has been 
brought by a Peruvian farmer against RWE – the single largest CO2 emitted in Europe - in a German 
court. The plaintiff is seeking a share of the costs for preventative measures needed to prevent the 
flooding of an Andean town based on RWE’s contribution to climate change.  English commentary on the 
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courts have yet to be considered on the merits, encountering instead preliminary obstacles 
relating to the American doctrines of pre-emption, displacement, standing, and a judiciary 
reluctance to make policy decisions that, in their view, rest with the political branches of 
government.116  
The case of Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation117 offers an example. 
Kivalina is a village inhabited by approximately 400 Inuit people located on the tip of a 
peninsula in Northern Alaska. As a result of climate change, the sea ice that protected the 
Kivalina coast from storm waves and surges diminished and the resulting erosion has reached the 
point where Kivalina is becoming uninhabitable. In 2008, faced with forced relocation at an 
estimated cost of $95 to $400 million, Kivalina commenced an action for damages against the 
twenty-four largest GHG emitters in the United States claiming (1) federal common law: public 
nuisance, (2) state law: public and private nuisance (3) civil conspiracy and (4) concert of action.  
The district court dismissed the case. It did so on the basis that the court lacked the 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the plaintiffs’ federal public nuisance claim as this would 
require the court “to make policy determinations relating to the use of fossil fuels and other 
energy sources and consider their value in relation to the environmental, economic and social 
consequences of such use.”118 A factor in this determination was that resolution of the claim 
would require the court to determine an acceptable limit on the level of GHG emissions emitted 
by the defendants and to make a policy decision about who should bear the costs associated with 
climate change. This, according to the district court, was a determination appropriately left to the 
executive and legislative branches.119 Furthermore, the district court in Kivalina was not 
persuaded that the standing requirement for federal court jurisdiction had been met. To establish 
standing under Article III of the United States’ Constitution, a plaintiff must show “(1) injury in 
fact; (2) causation; and (3) likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In 
the context of the standing requirement, the causation element requires the plaintiff to show a 
fairly traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the 
defendant.”120 Unlike formal tort causation, discussed further infra, this requirement requires 
only that the plaintiffs “show that there is a ‘substantial likelihood’ that defendant’s conduct 
                                                                                                                                                       
decision, Saul Luciano v. RWE, which dismissed the claim because of, inter alia, a lack of “legal 
causality” is currently on appeal); See, John Vidal, World’s largest carbon producers face landmark 
human rights case, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jul/27/worlds-largest-carbon-producers-face-landmark-
human-rights-case (providing commentary on the petition that was before the Commission on Human 
rights in the Philippines against forty-seven “carbon majors” complaining that their collective GHG 
emissions violated the human rights of millions of people living in the Philippines). 
116 American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2011) (stating the United States 
Supreme Court used the displacement doctrine to find that federal public nuisance was not available so 
long as the Environmental Protection Agency held the authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air 
Act while leaving open the availability of state-based public nuisance); Hari M. Osofsky, Litigation’s 
Role in the Path of U.S. Federal Climate Change Regulation: Implications for AEP v. Connecticut, 46 
Val. U. L. R. 447, passim (2012) (discussing in detail the court’s decision).  
117 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F. 3d. 849, 869-67 (9th Cir. 2012). 
118 Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corporation, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 870 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
119 Id. at 877. 
120 Id.  
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caused plaintiffs’ harm.”121 Nevertheless, with the plaintiffs “essentially conced[ing] that the 
genesis of global warming is attributable to numerous entities which individually and 
cumulatively over the span of centuries created the effects they now are experiencing,” the 
district court held that Kivalina lacked standing because there was “no realistic possibility of 
tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any 
specific person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time.”122 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of 
Kivalina’s federal public nuisance damages claim on the basis that the doctrine of displacement 
applied – in that the Federal Clean Air Act spoke directly to the question at issue.123 The court 
reached this finding despite the fact that the remedy sought by Kivalina in this action – that of 
damages – was not available to it under the Clean Air Act.124 While the majority did not 
comment on the issue of standing, in a concurring opinion Judge Pro concluded, for much the 
same reasons as the district court had, that Kivalina had failed to satisfy the causation element of 
standing.  
Even if these hurdles—some of which are uniquely American—can be cleared, for an 
action based in tort to succeed on the merits, a plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the harm complained of has been ‘caused’ by the defendant. As for-shadowed in the 
developing academic literature in this area125 and the treatment of the causation element of 
standing in Kivalina,126 causation presents a particular obstacle to climate change plaintiffs. This 
                                                
121 Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 880. 
123 The United States Supreme Court denied Kivalina’s petition for writ of certiorari in May 2013 without 
reason, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s decision standing.  
124 See, Karine Peloffy, Kivalina v. Exxonmobil: A Comparative Case Comment, 9 THE MCGILL INT’L J. 
OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. AND POL’Y 119, 121, 125-29 (2012) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit Court’s 
application of the doctrine of displacement in Kivalina).  
125  See, e.g., David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–31 (2003); DAVID A. GROSSMAN, Adjudicating Climate 
Change: State, National, and International Approaches 193–229 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M. 
Osofsky eds., 2009); Michael Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 12 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 11, 12–14, 56 (2012); MEINHARD DOELLE ET AL., Climate Liability in 
Canada: Transnational Law and Practice, 526–555 (Richard Lord ed., 2012); Jacqueline Peel, Issues in 
Climate Change Litigation, 24 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 15, 19 (2011); David Hunter & James 
Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1741, 1744–45 (2007). 
126 A similar standing issue arose in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, a procedurally complex climate change 
case involving a group of Mississippi Gulf Coast residents and property owners seeking damages from 
the defendant energy company’s plant on the basis that it had “[c]ause[d]” global warming which, 
increased the “[d]estructive [c]apacity” of Hurricane Katrina, which, in turn, damaged their property. The 
plaintiffs commenced an action in 2005 in the Southern District of Mississippi asserting claims of public 
and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil 
conspiracy against the companies. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 879–80 (5th Cir. 2009).  
The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that 
their claims were not justiciable under the political questions doctrine. On appeal, the panel reversed the 
district court’s decision in part, and held that plaintiffs had standing to bring claims for nuisance, trespass, 
and negligence, and that these claims were justiciable under the political questions doctrine. See Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053-55 (5th Cir. 2010). The appeal was ultimately dismissed, 
however, for lack of a quorum and a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus was denied. 
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is especially so for plaintiff’s seeking to attribute loss or damage to a specific weather event. As 
noted by Michael Gerrard in 2012, “It has become a truism in climate policy circles that specific 
weather events cannot be attributed to GHG emissions.”127 This is likely to be become easier as 
scientific understanding of the relationship between climate change and severe weather events 
evolves,128 or when the weather event results in a gradual and ongoing impact – such as sea level 
rise or loss of sea ice as in Kivalina. Yet, even then, if the harm associated with a specific event 
or the costs necessary to adapt to ongoing change can be attributed to climate change, the global 
nature of climate change creates a causation problem characterized by Jacqueline Peel as the 
“drop in the ocean problem.”129 The emissions from one entity, even a single or group of large 
industrial GHG emitters, cannot on their own be said to “cause” climate change. As a result, 
proving a causal link between climate change related harm and the cause and effect of the 
defendants’ actions remains challenging. Further, even if causation can be proven, the 
conventional rules for apportioning fault are difficult to apply against multiple defendants whose 
exact contributions are impossible to ascertain.130  
There will undoubtedly be further attempts to advance tort-based claims to damages for 
private and public costs associated with climate change. It is not the purpose of this Article to 
fully canvas – or pre-empt – the avenues available to do so. Rather, watching the building first 
wave of unsuccessful tort-based climate change litigation, and drawing on the similarities 
between tobacco and climate change, this Article now turns to consider, through the lens of the 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, what a comparable legislative response 
to these obstacles, in the form of a Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery 




As evidenced supra, there already exists a considerable body of literature with respect to 
climate change liability. Most of this scholarship, however, focuses on existing laws and doctrine 
and therefore merely confirms the current challenges encountered in climate change litigation.131 
In addition, while comparisons between climate change and other liability regimes such as for 
asbestos and hazardous substances have been made,132 recent comparisons with tobacco liability 
                                                                                                                                                       
See, In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011).  The same group of Gulf Coast residents and property owners 
then filed a new complaint in the Southern District of Mississippi in 2011, Comer (II), who dismissed 
their claims on the basis that their claims, inter alia, lacked Article III standing and were barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that finding on the basis 
of res judicata. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir. 2013). 
127 Gerrard, supra note 125. 
128 WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, https://www.wmo.int (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). 
129 Peel, supra note 125, at 16. This defence was raised, unsuccessfully, in Massachusetts v EPA, with the 
EPA arguing that its failure to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles made an insignificant 
contribution to the climate change related impacts suffered by the State of Massachusetts because of the 
global nature of the problem. Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007). 
130 Myles Allen, Liability for Climate Change: Will it Ever be Possible to Sue Anyone for Damaging the 
Climate?, 421 NATURE 891, 892 (2003); Gerrard, supra note 125. See also, Daniel A. Farber, 
Apportioning Climate Change Costs, UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 21, 29–30 (2008). 
131 See, e.g. Grossman, supra note 125; Gerrard, supra note 125. 
132 Daniel A. Farber, Responsibility for Historic Carbon Emissions: Lessons from Tort and Statutory 
Compensation Schemes, UC BERKELEY PUB. L. RES. PAPER NO. 2404372 (Mar. 4, 2014). 
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have primarily focused on the issue of disclosure (e.g. the New York Attorney General’s suit 
against Exxon under that state’s Martin’s Act,133 further discussed infra). University of British 
Columbia Professor Michael Byers and environmental lawyer and scholar Andrew Gage have 
recently identified the relevance of the precedent established by tobacco damages recovery 
legislation to the climate change context, but their analysis centered on litigation brought by 
foreign countries and does not consider the similarities and differences between these contexts in 
detail.134  
At their core, both tobacco and climate change liability involve the manufacture of 
products like tobacco and fossil fuels respectively, initially considered harmless but now 
understood as creating significant risks. In addition, the harms associated with tobacco and fossil 
fuels have private and public dimensions. The private consequences of tobacco consumption are 
most obvious, in the form of tobacco-related disease, but human-caused climate change will also 
result in various – if less direct – private harms, from health effects such as the migration of 
diseases such as West Nile Virus and Lyme disease, to property damage. In neither case, 
however, is the harm purely private because governments, as providers of public services, have 
already and will continue to bear significant additional costs, whether for healthcare, for 
adaptation in anticipation of predicted climate change effects or for construction to repair 
damage to public infrastructure following some climate-related event. The significant public 
costs associated with tobacco and climate change make the comparison between these two 
phenomena particularly compelling. 
Similarly, much like the publication of “Cancer by the Carton” in 1952 gave rise to a 
deliberate campaign of obfuscation by the tobacco industry, so too has the period since Dr. 
James Hansen’s testimony in 1988 seen the rise of an industry-funded campaign to manufacture 
doubt about the growing scientific evidence linking fossil fuels, GHG emissions and climate 
change,135 political advocacy against carbon regulation, and the aggressive development of new 
sources of fossil fuels.136 From 1989 to 2002, the Global Climate Coalition, formed by several 
investor-owned fossil fuel corporations that included ExxonMobil, Shell, and British Petroleum, 
reportedly led an aggressive lobbying and advertising campaign designed to create doubt about 
the IPCC’s integrity and the scientific evidence linking the burning fossil fuels to global 
warming.137 For example, the Global Climate Coalition played a role in the United States’ 
decision not to sign the Kyoto Protocol.138 ExxonMobil, in particular, is reported to have been 
active in the campaign to deny the science of climate change.139 As investigations have recently 
                                                
133 See Martin Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §352 (McKinney).  
134 ANDREW GAGE & MICHAEL BYERS, PAYBACK TIME? WHAT THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
CLIMATE LITIGATION COULD MEAN FOR CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES (2014), 
https://www.wcel.org/publication/payback-time-what-internationalization-climate-litigation-could-mean-
canadian-oil-and. 
135 Oreskes & Conway, supra note 51, at 184.  
136 See Frumhoff et al., supra note 37, at 164. 
137 Id. at 162. 
138 Id.; see also John Vidal, Revealed: How Oil Giant Influenced Bush, THE GUARDIAN (June 8, 2005), 
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139 David Kaiser & Lee Wasserman, The Rockefeller Family Fund vs. Exxon, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
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revealed, despite both understanding and accepting the validity of climate science, Exxon 
appears to have sponsored, both directly and indirectly, many of the scientists and think tanks 
that have sought to confuse and blur the scientific consensus around climate change.140 Taking a 
page out of what others have called the “Tobacco Strategy,”141 the “Exxon Position” was 
adopted to “emphasize the uncertainty in scientific conclusions regarding the potential enhanced 
greenhouse effect.”142 In the wake of these allegations, the New York, Massachusetts, California, 
and Virgin Islands Attorney Generals have begun investigating whether ExxonMobil committed 
fraud by failing to disclose many of the business risks of climate change to its shareholders 
despite evidence that it understood those risks internally, and thirteen more state Attorney 
Generals have announced that they were considering investigations of their own.143  
At the same time, there are also clear differences between fossil fuel usage and tobacco 
consumption. The ubiquity of fossil fuels in modern economies means that the potential pool of 
climate change defendants could be several times larger than in the tobacco context. The 
potential defendant pool also appears to be less homogenous, comprising not just manufacturers 
of fossil fuels but also potentially the manufacturers of products that consume fossil fuels and 
emit GHGs, such as major energy utilities and automobile manufacturers. These differences 
suggest the need to consider different approaches and a potentially broader set of underlying 
torts. For example, in order to succeed in negligence a defendant must be found to have owed a 
legal ‘duty of care’ to the plaintiff.144 Courts have been clear that such a duty is not owed to the 
public at large; there must be sufficient proximity between the two parties to warrant liability.145 
In products liability cases, this proximity is found in the relationship between manufacturers and 
the consumers of their goods.146 This may work with respect to some climate change defendants 
(e.g. gasoline retailers, vehicle manufacturers) but not others.  
In the following sections, the authors consider the similarities and differences between 
tobacco and fossil fuels in more detail through the lens of British Columbia’s Tobacco Damages 
and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, identifying that legislation’s potential analogs in a future 
Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Act. We begin by setting out the 
respective plaintiffs, the claim (or cause of action), and the defendants. We then move on to 
consider the potential mechanisms for establishing causation and apportioning liability. As will 
be seen, the question of extra-territorial harm (i.e. harm arising from actions outside of the 
relevant jurisdiction) – and more specifically how it is to be dealt with in terms of causation and 
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1–3 (2007). 
140 See Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch, & Susanne Rust, What Exxon Knew about 
the Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/; Katie 
Jennings, Dino Grandoni, & Susanne Rust, How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change 
Research, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/; Amy Lieberman & 
Susanne Rust, Big Oil Braced for Global Warming While It Fought Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2015), https://graphics.latimes.com/oil-operations/. 
141 Oreskes & Conway, supra note 51, at 186–90. 
142 See Jennings, Grandoni, & Rust, supra note 140; see also Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, 
Assessing ExxonMobil's Climate change Communications (1977–2014), 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS  1, 15 
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apportionment – arises in both the tobacco and climate change contexts, although it is admittedly 
more acute in the latter context.   
A. THE PLAINTIFFS 
In the tobacco context, the plaintiffs have been provincial and state-level governments. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the presumptive plaintiffs would also be provincial and state-
level governments, bearing in mind that British Columbia’s tobacco legislation was inspired by 
similar legislation in the United States.147 To the extent that they incur their own costs, however, 
we see no reason why national-level governments could not also pass legislation to sue for the 
recovery of their own costs.   
B. THE CLAIM 
1. Tobacco-Related Disease 
In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, Justice Major, for the Court, set out the relevant 
sections of the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act and then went on to 
summarize the essence of the cause of action set out therein:  
 
[6] …The government has a direct and distinct action against a manufacturer for 
the present value of existing and reasonably expected future expenditures by the 
government for  
 
(a) benefits as defined under the Hospital Insurance Act or the Medicare 
Protection Act; 
(b) payments under the Continuing Care Act; and 
(c) programs, services or benefits associated with disease, 
Where 
(a) such expenditures result from disease or the risk of disease caused or 
contributed to by exposure to a tobacco product; and 
(b) such exposure was caused or contributed to by 
(i) a tort committed in British Columbia by the manufacturer; or 
(ii) a breach of a common law, equitable or statutory duty or 
obligation owed by the manufacturer to persons in British 
Columbia who have been or might have become exposed to a 
tobacco product. 
  
[7] Viewed in this light, s. 2(1) creates a cause of action by which the government 
of British Columbia may recover from a tobacco manufacturer money spent 
treating disease in British Columbians, where such disease was caused by 
exposure to a tobacco product (whether entirely in British Columbia or not), and 
such exposure was caused by that manufacturer’s tort in British Columbia, or 
breach of a duty owed to persons in British Columbia.148 
 
                                                
147 See, e.g., Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §409.910 (West 1995). 
148 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2005 SCC 49 473, ¶¶ 2-7.  
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Justice Major went on to note that this cause of action was direct and distinct as opposed 
to a subrogated claim,149 and that the government’s claim can be pursued on an aggregate basis, 
“i.e., in respect of a population of persons for whom the government has made or can reasonably 
be expected to make expenditures,”150 in which case “it may use statistical, epidemiological and 
sociological evidence to prove its case:  s. 5(b)”151 and “need not identify, prove the cause of 
disease or prove the expenditures made in respect of any individual member of the population on 
which it bases its claim: s. 2(5)(a).”152 The specific rules with respect to causation and 
apportionment are further discussed infra.  
2. Climate Change 
Under a future Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Act, a 
province’s cause of action would similarly be “direct and distinct” and would seek to recover the 
costs of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage caused or contributed to by the climate 
change equivalent of a “tobacco-related wrong,” e.g., a climate-related wrong. As noted supra, 
the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act defines “tobacco-related wrong” as  
a tort committed in British Columbia by a manufacturer which causes or contributes to 
tobacco related disease, or …a breach of a common law, equitable or statutory duty or 
obligation owed by a manufacturer to persons in British Columbia who have been 
exposed or might become exposed to a tobacco product.153  
Setting the definition’s focus on manufacturers aside until the section on defendants infra 
Part III.C, a “climate change-related wrong” might similarly be defined as a tort committed in a 
province by a “designated party” that causes or contributes to climate change, or a breach of a 
common law equitable or statutory duty or obligation owed by a “designated party” to persons in 
a province who have been exposed or might become exposed to GHG-emitting – or perhaps 
more importantly climate altering – products. These torts could come in the form of private and 
public nuisances, the failure to warn, conspiracy, and strict liability. For each of the potential 
torts described, it will be necessary at some point to consider the reasonableness of the 
defendants’ conduct. 
a. Private and Public Nuisance 
Some scholars propose looking to private and public nuisance claims for climate 
compensation.154 Simply put, these nuisance claims focus on the harm suffered by plaintiffs, 





153 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, supra note 28, at 6314. 
154 ANDREW GAGE & MARGARETHA WEWERINKE, TAKING CLIMATE JUSTICE INTO OUR OWN HANDS, 
WEST COAST ENVTL. L (2015), http://wcel.org/resources/publication/taking-climate-justice-our-own-
hands. Private and public nuisance claims were advanced in both Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 870 (N.D. Cal. 2009) and Comer, supra  note 125, at 879–80. A public 
nuisance claim was also made in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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rather than defendants’ conduct, and support asserting jurisdiction where the harm occurred.155 
Both private and public nuisance could be effective at addressing climate change liability. 
Private nuisance is “an interference with [a] claimant’s use or enjoyment of land that is 
both substantial and unreasonable.”156 In St. Lawrence Cement, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that “nuisance is a field of liability that focuses on the harm suffered”157 and “reinforces the 
application of the polluter-pay principle.”158 Especially for individuals with coastal properties or 
properties otherwise affected by flooding or forest fires, this tort could reasonably be made out 
against fossil fuel manufacturers or those engaged in excessive GHG-emitting activities. From 
the perspective of the province, the focus is not on the actual harm caused by these breaches but 
rather the province’s subsequent costs in mitigating these harms and adapting public 
infrastructure to a new climatic regime.  
A public nuisance is defined in Canada as “any activity that unreasonably interferes with 
the public’s interest in questions of health, safety, morality, comfort or convenience... [t]he 
conduct complained of must amount to… an attack upon the rights of the public generally to live 
their lives unaffected by inconvenience, discomfort or other forms of interference.”159 The 
negligent burning of a public forest, including areas set aside for environmental reasons, was 
described as a public nuisance by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia v. Canadian 
Forest Products.160  
 
b. Negligence Including The Failure to Warn 
 
Less discussed in climate change liability literature161 but central to the tobacco context 
has been the tort of negligence, specifically the failure to warn. “There is a clear duty owed by 
manufacturers, not only to make and design their products reasonably, but to warn about any 
dangerous aspects of their products. These warnings must be explicit and reasonably 
communicated.”162 In the climate change context, setting the matter of jurisdiction aside for the 
moment, it is reasonable to suggest that gasoline manufacturers and retailers owe a duty of care 
to consumers to warn them of the risks of climate change associated with their product. These 
risks have been well understood since the 1994 signing  of the UNFCCC,163 if not since 1988 
when Hansen’s testimony moved climate change into the public consciousness.164  
Alternatively, or in addition, a novel duty of care could be recognized between the fossil 
fuel industry and governments where, as is the case with climate change, the harm is 
predominantly public and cumulative in nature.165 Perhaps the clearest articulation of such a duty 
                                                
155 Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 (Can.). 
156 Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. v. Ontario (Transportation), [2013] 1 S.C.R. 594, ¶ 18 (Can.). 
157 St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392, ¶ 77 (Can.). 
158 Id., at ¶ 80. 
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161 Grossman, supra note 125, at 39 (discussing product liability in the context of climate change).  
162 ALLEN M. LINDEN ET AL., CANADIAN TORT LAW: CASES, NOTES & MATERIALS 499 (14th ed. 2014).  
163 Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do about Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (2011). 
164 See Frumhoff et al., supra note 37, at 161. 
165 The possibility that industry could owe a private law duty of care to governments was explicitly left 
open by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 74, 2004 SCC 38, ¶¶ 80, 81. At the first stage of the duty of care test set out by the Supreme Court 
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– and its alleged breach – can be found in the Statements of a claim recently filed by three 
California counties against twenty major fossil fuel companies. The opening paragraph bears a 
striking resemblance to the United States District Court’s language describing the tobacco 
industry’s conduct in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. et al. (as discussed supra):  
 
Defendants, major corporate members of the fossil fuel industry, have known for 
nearly a half century that unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel 
products create greenhouse gas pollution that warms the planet and changes our 
climate. They have known for decades that those impacts could be catastrophic 
and that only a narrow window existed to take action before the consequences 
would not be reversible. They have nevertheless engaged in a coordinated, multi-
front effort to conceal and deny their own knowledge of those threats, discredit 
the growing body of publicly available scientific evidence, and persistently create 
doubt in the minds of customers, consumers, regulators, the media, journalists, 
teachers, and the public about the reality and consequences of the impacts of their 
fossil fuel pollution. At the same time, Defendants have promoted and profited 
from a massive increase in the extraction and consumption of oil, coal, and 
natural gas, which has in turn caused an enormous, foreseeable, and avoidable 
increase in global greenhouse gas pollution and a concordant increase in the 
concentration of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and 
methane, in the Earth’s atmosphere.166 
 
Indeed, there are several municipalities that recently passed bylaws requiring gasoline 
retailers to post some kind of warning label on gas pumps.167 Similarly, automobile 
manufacturers, at least those who manufacture cars with internal combustion engines, arguably 
have a duty to warn consumers of the climate change risks associated with their use. While there 
are differences in the kind of harm suffered by individuals in the contexts of tobacco and climate 
change, in both contexts the harms are now reasonably foreseeable. While climate change is 
perhaps the paradigmatic example of cumulative harm, the risk of actually developing a tobacco-
related disease is also not tied to a singular exposure (as is the case for asbestosis, for example) 
but rather the risk of disease increases with continuous exposure. Similarly, while smoking poses 
the greatest risk to the actual consumer, it also affects the non-smoking public through second-
                                                                                                                                                       
of Canada in Cooper v. Hobart, a plaintiff must establish that they were reasonably foreseeable and 
sufficiently proximate to establish a prima facie duty of care. Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 
(Can.). Arguably, municipal governments have been foreseeable plaintiffs since at least the Kivalina 
lawsuit. Similarly, proximity could be based on the long-understood cumulative and public nature of the 
harm. If a prima facie duty is made out, consideration shifts to residual policy considerations that would 
warrant negating the duty. We can think of no negative policy effects that would warrant negating a 
private law duty to avoid or mitigate the effects of climate change.  
166 Michael Burger, Local Governments in California File Common Law Claims Against Largest Fossil 
Fuel Companies, SABINE CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. CLIMATE L. BLOG (July 18, 2017), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2017/07/18/local-governments-in-california-file-common-
law-claims-against-largest-fossil-fuel-companies/. The causes of action pleaded include public and private 
nuisance, strict liability, negligence – including a failure to warn, and trespass.  
167 See Tamara Baluja, Climate Change Stickers Mandatory on North Vancouver Gas Pumps, CBC NEWS 
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/north-vancouver-climate-change-
stickers-gas-pumps-1.3323621. 
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hand smoke, just as the combustion of fossil fuels and the emission of GHGs affect those who 
purchase fossil fuel products as well as those who do not. Indeed, from a public policy 
perspective, the fact that there can be no “private consumption” of fossil-fuels, as there arguably 
can be for tobacco products, makes the case for liability that much stronger.  
We pause here to acknowledge that, at least insofar as a failure to warn is alleged, 
gasoline retailers and automobile manufacturers who do give adequate warnings may escape 
some liability on this front.168 In our view, the potential for such an outcome actually adds 
legitimacy and fairness to the exercise because it recognizes the role of each and every informed 
citizen in addressing climate change. At the same time, like those who suffer or suffered harm 
from second-hand smoke, this defense would not likely apply to harms incurred by those who 
did heed such warnings, e.g. those who purchase electric vehicles, and nevertheless suffered 




Another tort referred to frequently in the tobacco context is conspiracy. Consisting of two 
distinct branches in Canada, “unlawful means” conspiracy is made out where a) the defendants 
act in combination, that is, in concert, by agreement or with a common design; b) their conduct is 
unlawful; c) their conduct is directed towards the plaintiff; d) the defendants should know that, in 
the circumstances, injury to the plaintiff is likely to result; and e) their conduct causes injury to 
the plaintiff.170 Bearing in mind the similarities in the efforts to manufacture doubt about the 
risks of tobacco and climate, this tort – or some modified version of it – may well be relevant 
here.171 
 
d. Strict Liability 
 
Finally, there may be some future role for strict liability, or the Rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher, for climate change liability. This tort “imposes strict liability for damages caused to a 
plaintiff's property (and probably, in Canada, for personal damages) by the escape from the 
                                                
168 Cf. Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 CanLII 2382, ¶¶ 110–42 (Can. Que. Sup. Ct.) 
(discussing effect of warnings on potential liability for tobacco). The Canadian non-profit Our Horizon 
has designed warning labels that include photographs of endangered species such as caribou, with a 
caption that reads: “Warning: Use of this fuel product contributes to climate change which may put up to 
30% of species at a likely risk of extinction” see OUR HORIZON, http://ourhorizon.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 
2018). In addition, gasoline retailer Petro-Canada (owned by Suncor Energy) has recently voluntarily 
added climate labels to its fuel pumps that advise customers to “play [their] part in helping to reduce 
climate change by using our products responsibly” and directing them to their “pump talk” website. 
PETRO CANADA, http://www.pumptalk.ca/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). 
169 See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(“Some courts have also held that the duty to warn extends to ‘third persons exposed to a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of harm by the failure to warn.’” (quoting McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 
11 N.Y.2d 62, 68-69 (1962))). 
170 Agribands Purina Canada Inc. v. Kasamekas [2011], 106 O.R. 3d 427, ¶ 26 (Can. Ont. C.A.), as 
mentioned in Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494 (Can.).  
171 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F. 3d. 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, 718 F. 3d. 460, 465 (5th Cir. 2013) (both cases presenting claims based on conspiracy).   
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defendant's property of a substance ‘likely to cause mischief.’”172 As recently interpreted by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, strict liability may well become applicable in the climate change 
context as CO2 and other GHGs become more strictly regulated, thus foreseeable as likely to 
cause mischief,173 especially in instances where they have been emitted in contravention of 
established standards or “escaped” in Smith v. Inco terms.174 Such is arguably the case with 
respect to the recent scandal involving Volkswagen, which in 2015 admitted “to installing secret 
software in hundreds of thousands of United States’ diesel cars to cheat exhaust emissions tests 
and make them appear cleaner than they were on the road.”175 Strict liability thus potentially 
offers a broader approach for imposing damages wherever causation is evident, regardless of a 
defendant’s culpability.  
 
e. The Reasonableness of the Defendants’ Conduct 
 
To varying degrees, the reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct is relevant for most of 
the torts discussed. In the climate change context, Professor Deborah Curran suggests that the 
basic question is the point in time at which the fossil-fuel industry’s conduct becomes intentional 
and the interference unreasonable, “where the harm (environmental, economic and social) 
outweighs the benefit (economic and social).”176 Citing the observations of Hunter and Saltzman 
that “the relative risk-utility balance of climate changing activities is shifting,” Curran suggests 
that litigation will increasingly focus “on those companies within a sector that are lagging behind 
the industry leaders in responding to climate change… Inquiries into the reasonableness of a 
company’s operations or products turn into inquiries into how they compare to those of others. In 
this way, today’s industry laggards may be tomorrow’s climate defendants.”177 Beyond 
operations and products, Hunter and Saltzman also suggest that inquiries into unreasonableness 
of a company’s activities might also include: “issuing or promoting misinformation about 
climate change that the company knows or reasonably should have known is false; withholding 
studies or information that would increase our understanding of climate change; and destroying 
climate change related documents.”178  
With respect to private and public nuisance, under existing Canadian doctrine this 
analysis is secondary to the consideration of the interference with the use and enjoyment of 
private property or public rights, respectively. That being said, the “nature of the defendant’s 
conduct is not…an irrelevant consideration. Where the conduct is either malicious or careless, 
that will be a significant factor in the reasonableness analysis… where the defendant can 
establish that his or her conduct was reasonable, that can be a relevant consideration…”179 In 
                                                
172 Smith v. Inco Ltd. (2011), 107 O.R. 3d 321, ¶ 68 (Can. Ont. C.A.)   
173 It is worth noting here that these are already deemed “toxic substances” under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33. 
174 Smith, 107 O.R. 3d 321 at ¶ 68. It is also worth noting that the six GHGs listed in Annex A of the 
Kyoto Protocol (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafluoride) are listed as toxic substances under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, sched. 1.   
175 See Volkswagen Agrees to $4.3B U.S. Emissions Scandal Settlement, CBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/volkswagen-emissions-settlement-1.3930655. 
176Deborah Curran, Climate Change Backgrounder, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
748 (Meinhard Doelle & Chris Tollefson eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
177 Id. at 749. 
178 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 125, at 1775. 
179 Antrim Truck Centre Ltd. V. Ontario (Transportation), [2013] 1 S.C.R. 594, ¶ 29 (Can.). 
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what is the Supreme Court of Canada’s last word on the matter, however, a “finding of 
reasonable conduct will not…necessarily preclude a finding of liability.”180  
With respect to negligence, the “standard of care” is the benchmark of this tort. It serves 
as an objective standard informed by several factors, including the presence of reasonably 
foreseeable risks, the cost of preventing or reducing such risks, and the utility of the conduct in 
question.181 The greater the risk (a function of the probability and magnitude of potential harm), 
the more likely it is that the standard of care will require some measures to prevent or at least 
reduce that risk. In the specific context of product liability and the duty to warn, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has stated that “[a]ll warnings must be reasonably communicated, and must 
clearly describe any specific dangers that arise from the ordinary use of the product.”182 It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the fossil fuel industry could be more explicit and proactive about the 
risks of climate change in light of the high probability, ninety-five  percent according to IPCC5, 
and magnitude of potential harm, i.e., $100 billions.183 For example, it seems clear that current 
automobile marketing strategies do not address the reasonably foreseeable risks associated with 
climate change. According to recent analysis by the Sierra Club, automobile manufacturers in the 
United States are spending only a fraction of their massive marketing budgets on low emission 
vehicles.184 This is consistent with recent analysis showing that in both Canada and the United 
States, the number of “car” class vehicles sold has fallen at the same time that sales of “truck” 
class vehicles, with their higher emissions, have dramatically increased (see Figure 1). If 
automobile manufacturers’ marketing strategies ignore climate change risks, e.g. by failing to 
warn consumers about the risks of climate change or failing to raise consumer awareness about 
the benefits and availability of lower-emission vehicles, they are arguably inconsistent with the 
applicable standard of care.  
 
Figure 1: Car v. Truck Sales (Canada, 1965-2016)185  
 
                                                
180 Id. 
181 PHILIP H. OSBORNE, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 2011). 
182 Hollis v. Dow Corning Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 634, ¶ 20 (Can.). 
183 NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at iv-v, xxi (2006), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm; 
NAT’L ROUNDTABLE ON THE ENV’T AND THE ECON., supra note 98. 
184 Gina Coplon-Newfield, New Data Shows Auto Industry Failing to Advertise Electric Cars, SIERRA 
CLUB: COMPASS (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.sierraclub.org/compass/2016/12/new-data-shows-auto-
industry-failing-advertise-electric-cars. 
185 Jamie Carson (@carsjam33), TWITTER (Jul. 19, 2016, 8:15 AM), 
https://twitter.com/carsjam33/status/755420762681507842. 





C. THE DEFENDANTS 
1. Tobacco-Related Disease 
Under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, potential liability has 
been restricted to “manufacturers,” although that term has been fairly broadly defined:  
 
“manufacturer” means a person who manufactures or has manufactured a tobacco 
product and includes a person who currently or in the past 
(a) causes, directly or indirectly, through arrangements with contractors, 
subcontractors, licensees, franchisees or others, the manufacture of a tobacco 
product, 
(b) for any fiscal year of the person, derives at least 10% of revenues, determined on 
a consolidated basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in 
Canada, from the manufacture or promotion of tobacco products by that person or by 
other persons, 
(c) engages in, or causes, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage in the 
promotion of a tobacco product, or 
(d) is a trade association primarily engaged in 
(i) the advancement of the interests of manufacturers, 
(ii) the promotion of a tobacco product, or 
(iii) causing, directly or indirectly, other persons to engage in the promotion 
of a tobacco product; 
 
It was the definition of “manufacturer” in the first iteration of the Act that the British 
Columbia Supreme Court deemed ultra vires, i.e. beyond the jurisdiction of, the provincial 
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legislation by reason of extra-territoriality.186  Specifically, the Court held the term manufacturer 
was, in essence, an attempt to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on entities with no 
real connection to British Columbia.187  
Importantly, “manufacturers” is still a relatively broad term, including trade associations 
engaged in the advancement of the tobacco industry’s interests. It is worth noting, however, that 
the potential pool of defendants could have been broader still. For example, it could have 
included tobacco farmers,188 or the restaurants and bars that for many decades derived an 
economic benefit from allowing smoking on their premises and even lobbied against restrictions 
on smoking in public places. Similarly, it could have included employers that allowed smoking 
in their workplaces. Presumably, the legislature chose to focus on manufacturers because of their 
egregious conduct, but also, as in all instances where a decision to sue is made,189 their ability to 
pay. The fundamental point here is that the legislation does not attempt to capture all relevant 
tort-feasors and yet this did not detract from the legality of the legislation as determined by the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
 
2. Climate Change 
 
Under a future Climate Change Damages and Adaptation Costs Recovery Act, potential 
liability might similarly be restricted to a broadly conceptualized class of “manufacturers.” 
Those who manufacture, or have in the past manufactured, fossil-fuel products intended for 
combustion i.e, coal, oil and natural gas, are perhaps the most obvious defendants. As noted 
supra, this category of defendants has been named in the first wave of climate change 
litigation.190 However, just as in tobacco litigation, it would be reasonable to expand the potential 
pool of manufacturers. The range of defendants will be motivated, in part, by the type of tort, 
legislation, and jurisdictional limits. 
 
a. Expanding the Pool of Defendants 
 
It is reasonable to include manufacturers of products that are GHG-intensive (e.g. coal 
and natural gas-based energy producers and other GHG-intensive industries such as cement 
manufacturers) and manufacturers of products that, in turn, demand the combustion of fossil 
fuels (e.g. manufacturers of automobiles with combustion engines). Both the energy sector191 and 
automobile manufacturers192 have already been named as defendants in the first wave litigation. 
Finally, just as the tobacco legislation expanded the pool of potential defendants to capture trade 
associations, the climate change legislation might include trade associations advancing the fossil-
fuel industry’s interests, at least to the extent that these have engaged in the deceptive marketing 
practices of their tobacco counterparts.  
                                                
186 JTI-Macdonald Corp. v. Att’y Gen. B.C., 2000 CarswellBC 375, ¶¶ 151-220 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
187 Id.  
188 These were actually compensated pursuant to the MSA.  
189 OSBORNE, supra note 181. 
190 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F. 3d. 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2012). 
191 See, e.g., id.  
192 See, e.g., People v. General Motors Corp. et al., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007). 
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It would, of course, be possible to stretch the potential pool of defendants captured by 
this legislation even further, to include the distributors and ultimate consumers of GHG-emitting 
products: those who sell and purchase inefficient motor vehicles; those who sell and purchase 
gas to fuel those vehicles; or, those who distribute and consume coal-fired power. A myriad of 
common activities cumulatively contributes to the problem of climate change. However, just as 
with the tobacco legislation, decisions as to which parties to sue should be informed by conduct, 
ability to pay, and public policy concerns as to who should ultimately bear responsibility and 
therefore liability based on their relative contribution to the problem.  
In the case of climate change, early attention has focused on longstanding and major 
manufactures of fossil fuel products intended for combustion and manufacturers of GHG 
intensive products in light of both historic and ongoing contribution to atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs. As noted supra, Heede has traced sixty-three percent of the industrial 
CO2 and methane emissions released globally between 1854 to 2010 to just ninety fossil fuel and 
cement producers – with more than half of the industrial CO2 emissions traced in Heede’s study 
emitted since 1986.193 And, as with tobacco, the culpability of some within these classes of 
defendants is heightened by their response, or lack of response, to the developing understanding 
of climate change and its associated risks. For example, Frumhoff et al. ascribe heightened 
responsibility to those defendants who failed to take responsible action in the face of the 
developing scientific consensus around climate change and instead promoted misinformation in 
order to confuse and blur the scientific consensus or delay regulatory action.194  
 
b. Jurisdictional Limits 
 
A decision about whether the focus of the legislation is on global emissions or emissions 
from within the province has real implications on determining potential defendants and which of 
the torts canvassed supra Part III.B will be relied upon. Taking a global approach (e.g. Heede’s 
ninety fossil fuel and cement producers), the most attractive tort may well be nuisance (private 
and/or public), bearing in mind that tort’s focus on the plaintiff’s harm (see also Figure 2, infra, 
showing that even within Canada, the most important GHG-emitting facilities are not evenly 
distributed across the provinces). It would be unreasonable, however, to rule out the other torts at 
this early stage of the analysis, bearing in mind not only the current approach to establishing the 
situs of a tort195 but also the direction that the relevant tests may take as tort law is itself shaped 
by the reality of climate change.196  
 
                                                
193 Heede, supra note 99, at 231–34. The analysis includes scope 1, scope 2 and use of product scope 3 
emissions. 
194 See Frumhoff et al., supra note 37, at 163–166.; see also, Damian Carrington & Jelmer Mommers, 
‘Shell knew’: Oil Giant’s 1991 Film Warned of Climate Change Danger, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/feb/28/shell-knew-oil-giants-1991-film-warned-climate-
change-danger. 
195 Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, ¶ 88 (The situs of the tort is clearly an appropriate 
connecting factor… The difficulty lies in locating the situs, not in acknowledging the validity of this 
factor once the situs has been identified). 
196 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do about Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1 
(2011). 
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It is also at this stage that the distinction between the power to legislate and right to sue 
needs to be kept in mind. In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., the Supreme Court 
described the latter as subsidiary to the former, which meant that such legislation could capture 
breaches outside of the enacting jurisdiction:   
 
…the driving force of the [Tobacco] Act’s cause of action is compensation for the 
government of British Columbia’s health care costs, not remediation of tobacco 
manufacturers’ breaches of duty. While the Act makes the existence of a breach 
of duty one of several necessary conditions to a manufacturer’s liability to the 
government, it is not the mischief at which the cause of action created by the Act 
is aimed. The Act leaves breaches of duty to be remedied by the law that gives 
rise to the duty. Thus, the breaches of duty to which the Act refers are of 
subsidiary significance to the cause of action created by it, and the locations 
where those breaches might occur have little or no bearing on the strength of the 
relationship between the cause of action and the enacting jurisdiction.”198 
                                                
197 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE CANADA, https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-
indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=31022B8E-.1. 
198 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, ¶ 40 (Can.) (emphasis added). 




This analysis may be sufficient to distinguish the tobacco and climate change 
compensation contexts from that which was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. v. Dryden Chemicals Ltd,199 wherein Manitoba enacted 
legislation creating a cause of action in Manitoba against polluters in the neighboring provinces 
of Saskatchewan and Ontario. In a 3-1-3 split decision, a narrow majority held that Manitoba 
could not make a law punishing companies that lawfully emitted pollutants in Saskatchewan and 
Ontario, even if those pollutants made their way into Manitoba. However, the majority was 
influenced by the legislation purporting to deal with the pollution of interprovincial waterways, a 
matter held to fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction over seacoast and inland fisheries.200 The 
decision is four decades old and has been heavily criticized, including by one of Canada’s 
leading constitutional scholars.201  
 
Alternatively, a province or state may choose to focus only on those defendants whose 
conduct or activities generated GHG emissions within its jurisdiction, in which case any of the 
torts canvassed above would be available. In this respect, we begin by noting that the first wave 
of climate litigation has restricted its edge-cutting ambition to defendants within their domestic 
jurisdictions.202 Second, as Osofsky203 and Peel204 have argued, there is merit in thinking of 
climate change as a multi-scalar problem – capable of engaging several levels of governance. 
While there is an obvious appeal to focus on those defendants who could be said to have 
contributed the greatest share to climate change on a global scale, this approach is also not 
without its problems, including potential difficulties with enforcing any subsequent judgments.205 
In light of these and other challenges, governments may prefer to focus on defendants fully 
within their jurisdictions and to rely instead on innovative approaches to causation and 
apportionment.  
                                                
199 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477 (Can.); In the United States, see North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010). 
200 Interprovincial Cooperatives Ltd. v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, 478 (Can.). 
201 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 13-10 to 13-11 (5th ed. 2007). In his concurring 
judgment Judge Richie was satisfied that the Provincial legislation dealing exclusively with the effect of 
pollution has controlling effect within the territorial limits of the province by which it is enacted. His 
concern was focused on the provision in the Manitoba legislation directed at nullifying the effect of 
permission duly granted by the regulatory authority of another jurisdiction because it provided that it was 
not a lawful excuse “to show that the discharge of the contaminant was permitted by the appropriate 
regulatory authority having jurisdiction at the place where the discharge occurred, if that regulatory 
authority did not also have jurisdiction at the place where the contaminant caused damage to the fishery.” 
202 See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (naming 
twenty-two fossil fuel, energy companies and utilities operating in the United States as defendants); 
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 718 F.3d 460, 466 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013) (naming twenty-four fossil fuel and 
energy companies and utilities operating in the Gulf Coast for property damage sustained during 
Hurricane Katrina); Osofsky supra note 116, at 457 (discussing impacts of the AEP case, in which 
plaintiffs list the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States as defendants in their public 
nuisance action). 
203 Osofsky, supra note 116.  
204 Peel, supra note 125. 
205 See e.g., Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It 
Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 152 (2013). 




Finally, in the event of such legislation and litigation, the fossil fuel industry would likely 
attempt to add governments as defendants to the suit for their role in encouraging fossil fuel 
development or in passing sub-optimal regulatory standards. Under current Canadian doctrine at 
least, such an attempt is unlikely to succeed. In R v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,206 the 
Supreme Court of Canada rejected such efforts by the tobacco industry in the tobacco context on 
the basis that such governmental actions and decisions were properly characterized as “policy” in 
nature and therefore immune from liability.207 
 




In British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Judge Major explained the mechanics of 
causation and the important presumptive rules referred to at the outset of this Article as follows:  
 
[9] Where the government’s claim is made on an aggregate basis, it may use 
statistical, epidemiological and sociological evidence to prove its case:  s. 5(b).  It 
need not identify, prove the cause of disease or prove the expenditures made in 
respect of any individual member of the population on which it bases its claim:  s. 
2(5)(a)… 
  
[10] Pursuant to s. 3(1) and (2), the government enjoys a reversed burden of proof 
in respect of certain elements of an aggregate claim.  Where the aggregate claim 
is…to recover expenditures in respect of disease caused by exposure to cigarettes, 
the reversed burden of proof operates as follows.  Once the government proves 
that 
 
(a) the defendant manufacturer breached a common law, equitable or statutory 
duty or obligation it owed to persons in British Columbia who have been or 
might become exposed to cigarettes; 
(b) exposure to cigarettes can cause or contribute to disease; and 
(c) during the manufacturer’s breach, cigarettes manufactured or promoted by the 
manufacturer were offered for sale in British Columbia, 
 
the court will presume that 
 
(a) the population that is the basis for the government’s aggregate claim would 
not have been exposed to cigarettes but for the manufacturer’s breach; and 
(b) such exposure caused or contributed to disease in a portion of the population 
that is the basis for the government’s aggregate claim. 
  
[11]   In this way, it falls on a defendant manufacturer to show that its breach of 
duty did not give rise to exposure, or that exposure resulting from its breach of 
                                                
206 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).  
207 Id. at ¶¶ 63-96. 
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duty did not give rise to the disease in respect of which the government claims for 
its expenditures.  The reversed burden of proof on the manufacturer is a balance 
of probabilities:  s. 3(4). 208 
 
The causation “gap” filled by British Columbia’s tobacco legislation is two-fold. The 
government does not need to prove that British Columbians suffered disease as a result of 
exposure to cigarettes, but rather that any population would suffer disease as a result of such 
exposure, for which section 5 makes clear it may rely on statistical and epidemiological 
evidence.209 More importantly, the government does not need to prove that British Columbians 
suffering from tobacco-related disease have or are doing so as a result of breaches by the 
defendants in the province. Instead, defendants will be presumed to have caused the disease of 
British Columbians who have purchased tobacco products in the neighboring State of 
Washington, as well as arrivals to British Columbia who are suffering from disease as a result of 
exposure that occurred in their previous jurisdiction. In other words, the legislature chose to 
subject the defendants to potential liability for costs that they very likely did not cause, subject to 
a reverse burden of proof.  
 
With respect to apportionment, Judge Major explained it as follows: 
  
[12] Where the aforementioned presumptions apply, the court must determine the 
portion of the government’s expenditures after the date of the manufacturer’s 
breach that resulted from exposure to cigarettes:  s. 3(3)(a).  The manufacturer is 
liable for such expenditures in proportion to its share of the market for cigarettes 
in British Columbia, calculated over the period of time between its first breach of 
duty and trial:  ss. 3(3)(b) and 1(6). 
  
[13] In an action by the government, a manufacturer will be jointly and severally 
liable for expenditures arising from a joint breach of duty (i.e., for expenditures 
caused by disease, which disease was caused by exposure, which exposure was 
caused by a joint breach of duty to which the manufacturer was a party):  s. 
4(1).210 
  
2. Climate change 
 
Several scholars, including Andrew Gage and Margaretha Wewerinke note that 
“causation” is frequently invoked as one of the largest barriers to successful climate damages 
litigation.211 As discussed supra, the significance of this barrier is foreshadowed by the standing 
analysis in some first wave climate litigation cases. The most important lesson from the tobacco 
context may not be the specific ways in which certain presumptions have been applied, but rather 
to highlight that the rules of causation and apportionment are not immutable. Therefore, in 
examining legislative changes to causation and apportionment, it is important to look at a variety 
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One legislative approach to the barriers posed by causation is to incorporate “modest” 
legislative changes, such as those proposed by Gage and Wewerinke.212 This approach, which is 
more suited to reliance on Heede’s analysis and a focus on global GHG emissions, recognizes 
that scientific evidence is becoming more sophisticated to allow quantification of the likelihood 
of a particular weather event or impact resulting from climate change, and the approach attempts 
to strike a balance between the procedural rights of plaintiffs and defendants so as to avoid 
undermining the credibility of the legislation and decisions made under it.213  
Another approach is to more boldly fill the causation “gap” as British Columbia’s 
tobacco legislation has. This would be especially necessary with legislation that focuses on 
emissions-generating conduct within the province. In this case, while all defendants will have 
contributed to climate change, it could not be said on a traditional “but for” basis that any 
particular one defendant was a necessary cause of the province’s incurred costs associated with 
climate change. As in the tobacco context, this problem could arguably be addressed by creating 
a presumption that the province’s costs associated with climate change (both the remediation of 
damage and adaptation costs) occurred as a result of emissions-generating activities in the 
province. This, in turn, means that the defendants will be presumed to have caused the climate 
change related harm in British Columbia resulting from GHG emissions in other jurisdictions.  
In other words, the legislature could choose – as it did in the tobacco context – to subject 
the defendants to potential liability for costs that they alone did not cause, subject to a reverse 
burden of proof. It could then fall on the defendants to show on a balance of probabilities that 
their respective breaches did not cause or contribute to the expenditures incurred by the 
government. For this purpose, climate change damages and adaptation costs recovery legislation 
could fill the causation gap by adapting a version of the “material contribution to risk” test set 
out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Clements v. Clements.214 As a matter of Canadian 
common law, the “material contribution to risk” test is available where:  
 
The plaintiff effectively has established that the “but for” test, viewed globally, 
has been met.  It is only when it is applied separately to each defendant that the 
“but for” test breaks down because it cannot be shown which of several negligent 
defendants actually launched the event that led to the injury. The plaintiff thus has 
shown negligence and a relationship of duty owed by each defendant, but faces 
failure on the “but for” test because it is “impossible”, in the sense just discussed, 
                                                
212 Id. at 31–32. These commentators’ propose model climate change legislation that: affirms that the 
court “may have regard to scientific or statistical information or modeling, historical experience and 
information derived from other relevant studies, including information derived from sampling”; confirms 
that the doubling of the likelihood of a particular type of event occurred due to climate change is 
equivalent to proof on the balance of probabilities that the event was caused by climate change; and, 
confirms expenses reasonably incurred in order to adapt or prepare for, expected climate change related 
impacts, including costs not yet incurred, are expenses caused by climate change. 
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to show which act or acts were injurious. In such cases, each defendant who has 
contributed to the risk of the injury that occurred can be faulted.215 
 
To satisfy the test, the plaintiff must establish that the “loss would not have occurred ‘but 
for’ the negligence of two or more tortfeasors, each possibly in fact responsible for the loss” and 
that the plaintiff “through no fault of her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible 
tortfeasors in fact was the necessary or ‘but for’ cause of her injury, because each can point to 
one another as the possible ‘but for’ cause of the injury.”216 This test is not perfectly applicable 
in the climate change context because each defendant would have in fact contributed to the 
cumulative impact (i.e. each actually “launched the event that led to the injury”), but not one of 
them was a necessary cause. Some modification would also be necessary to the traditional 
exclusionary de minimis rule,217 as all contributions – even those caught by Heede’s analysis, 




For the purposes of apportionment, under a global approach that  focuses on the world’s 
largest GHG emitters, Gage and Wewerinke adopt a proportional contribution approach, 
meaning that “a company which is responsible for 2% of GHG emissions should be responsible 
for 2% of the damages caused by climate change.”218 They also propose that companies with 
“overlapping responsibilities” for specific emissions should be jointly and severally liable and 
that judges be given discretion, based on specific considerations, to vary the liability assigned to 
a particular defendant.219  
Where the legislation is aimed first and foremost at GHG emissions within a province’s 
jurisdiction, entirely different issues need to be considered. Perhaps obviously, applying 
proportional contribution logic would thwart the effectiveness of the legislation, as even a large 
emitter in a province such as British Columbia would proportionally contribute only a small 
percentage of the overall GHG emissions causing climate change, making recovery of the 
province’s costs negligible.  
However, there are compelling reasons to consider alternative approaches to 
apportionment in such a scheme, which would still allow the province to recover a large 
proportion, if not all, of its costs. We note first that, in Canada at least, apportionment has not 
traditionally relied on mechanistic assessments of physical causation (e.g. which tortfeasor was 
the primary or secondary cause of harm) but rather has focused on the moral blameworthiness of 
the relevant conduct.220 Along these lines, a failure to capture provincial and state-level 
emissions that may not be globally significant would seem to give a “free pass” to the vast 
majority of defendants in Canada, which nevertheless form part of the thirty-seven percent of 
emitters not represented in Heede’s analysis.  
While such an approach may seem draconian at present, it may seem much less so in a 
climate-changed future. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would appear to be a matter of 
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legislative policy, not immutable legal principle. As noted by the Supreme Court in British 
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco: 
 
The judiciary’s role is not…to apply only the law of which it approves… Nor is it 
to second-guess the law reform undertaken by legislators, whether that reform 
consists of a new cause of action or procedural rules to govern it.  Within the 
boundaries of the Constitution, legislatures can set the law as they see fit.221 
 
Under either a global approach or one focused on emissions within the enacting 
jurisdiction, the issue of apportionment will raise different challenges for different claims. For 
example, in the case of a car manufacturer who sold cars emitting more GHGs than the accepted 
standard, as determined by a standard of care analysis, it would be reasonably straightforward to 
apportion GHG emissions to the defendant based on the number of vehicles sold in the province. 
The challenge then becomes what portion of the government expenditures can be apportioned to 
the defendant in light of the GHG emissions it is responsible for (as discussed above). Similarly, 
a coal plant can be attributed GHG emissions relative to a minimum accepted standard for 
electricity generation. The bigger challenge, again, is the apportionment of mitigation, adaptation 
and loss and damage costs incurred by the plaintiff government per ton of GHG emissions 
attributed to the defendant.  One approach would be to establish a formula in legislation, such as 
dividing the cost incurred by a government in a given year by the total GHG emissions in that 
same year, and use the resulting cost per ton as the basis for apportioning liability. Different 
issues on apportionment would arise with respect to failure to warn and conspiracy based claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Inspired by developments in tobacco litigation and liability, this Article explored the 
potential for legislation to be developed to assist future governments to recover some of the costs 
of mitigation, adaptation and loss, and damage associated with climate change.  
While recognizing that such legislation could ultimately take different forms, the 
comparison to tobacco is useful because it illustrates the potential for the law to respond 
dynamically to changing facts, values, and norms. By comparing the liability issues associated 
with climate change to governments’ efforts to recover health care and related costs associated 
with the use of tobacco, we have also been able to identify two categories of challenges 
associated with climate liability. The first category involves challenges that were encountered in 
the tobacco context and successfully addressed through legislation. These included litigation 
resources, issues of causation and personal culpability, and apportionment. The tobacco 
experience suggests that similar challenges can be overcome through similar legislative 
provisions in the climate context. The guidance offered by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
context of the tobacco industry’s challenges to the tobacco legislation is particularly helpful in 
this regard. It suggests that while there may be some territorial limits to the ability of 
jurisdictions to recover costs associated with climate change, there is still considerable room to 
adjust common law rules through legislation to hold those responsible for these costs 
accountable. The lynchpin in such legislation, according to the Supreme Court, is the 
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government’s claim for compensation for costs it has incurred. It does not matter that such 
legislation “may capture, to some extent, activities occurring outside of” the province enacting 
such legislation,222 so long as “there is at all times one critical connection to [the province]: the 
recovery permitted by the action is in relation to expenditures by the government…for [the 
residents of the province].”223 
The second category consists of challenges that are unique to climate change and that will 
require different legislative solutions than those employed in the tobacco context. They include 
the broader geographic distribution of the harm associated with the release of GHG emissions, 
the broader range of sources of GHG emissions, and the broader range of possible defendants, 
which could include the fossil fuel industry itself, large scale consumers of fossil fuel and 
manufacturers of products that rely on fossil fuels. These challenges will require further 
consideration to ensure that proposed solutions will withstand inevitable court challenges. The 
general direction offered in the context of the challenges to the tobacco legislation does provide 
some guidance on the parameters within which solutions can be designed.   
Importantly, as high as the stakes were and are with respect to tobacco-related disease, 
the stakes are much higher with respect to climate change. The future costs to governments will 
grow exponentially over time, which in turn will increase the pressure on governments to seek 
contribution from those responsible. Of course, the extent of the problem will depend on future 
global efforts to reduce GHG emissions through political initiatives such as the Paris Climate 
Agreement. For each potential defendant, potential liability may depend on how their efforts 
going forward measure up against possible standards, such as best available technology.224 In the 
meantime, provincial and state governments have the opportunity to send important signals to 
key industry sectors by passing such legislation sooner rather than later. 
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